Hello! This blog post is now part of my newly published ebook “Smoke No Evil“, which is published on Amazon but its available free for the asking to visitors like you – see below.
I here’s nothing wrong with smoking Tobacco. It’s as safe as wine, beer, or cheeseburgers. It’s the Tobacco Cartel’s products that sicken and kill. “Smoking-related Death” has nothing to do with Tobacco. Many people understand the truth, but don’t know the whole story.
Just click here to request your free review copy of “Smoke No Evil”. After you read it, I hope that you’ll add your voice to those demanding investigation and accountability for the Tobacco Cartel. My hope is also that the knowledge in this book can be life-changing for smokers who are trapped in addiction to commercial Tobacco Cartel products, and life-affirming for those who already understand and smoke or vape only organic tobacco whenever possible.
Whether you smoke, vape, or chew tobacco this book destroys the myth that tobacco is going to harm you. Using data and hard evidence, this book proves that it’s not tobacco killing millions of smokers every year, and it never has been. You’ll see how the “science” used to prove that Tobacco is a killer is pure fraud and deception on the part of the Tobacco Cartel, and pure hypocrisy on the part of regulators and anti-tobacco propagandists.
My hope is that the knowledge here can be life-changing for smokers who are trapped in addiction to commercial Tobacco Cartel products, particularly people who are members of oppressed minority communities where the damage from pesticides in cheap tobacco products is magnified by genetic vulnerability.
The following data are unique – nobody has tested cigarettes for fungicides and insecticides since the early 1970s when all research was shut down worldwide by the Tobacco Cartel. Prior to that there were extensive studies, all pointing to heavy concentrations of pesticides, but as science advanced the industry understood that their products would be banned unless they took control of any research that could lead to regulation, and so they did. They just shut it all down, worldwide. You can browse a few examples of the surviving tobacco/cigarette pesticide research on DDT and organochlorine pesticides in cigarettes that virtually ended in the 1970s here and here andhere and here and here. As you can see from these few studies, for about 20 years 1955-1975 there were entire journals devoted to researching pesticide residues in cigarettes, but all that came to a screeching stop in the early 1970s. It is as if some kind of policy decision was made that there would be no more of this kind of information readily available to the public. Even in Land Grant University libraries it’s very difficult to find and access print copies of these old agricultural journals journals and the digital archives appear to have been scrubbed.
Oddly enough, the Cartel kept very detailed internal review and research processes going throughout the 20th Century aimed at determining the impact of each of the pesticides they were using on consumer taste. They were concerned that these deadly chemicals might make smokers think the cigarettes tasted funny, and they spent hundreds of millions on this research – in plain sight of government agencies. But because all of this research was private, and because they were able to totally suppress any publicly-funded research on pesticides, the subject of what these chemicals were doing to smokers was totally concealed behind corporate walls. There was and is a conspiracy of silence in the Federal government that can only be due to impeccably concealed political and economic influence and the deepest possible corruption.
The tests that yielded the data you see in this post were the first of their kind since @ 1970, and were run by a uniquely qualified pesticide testing lab, a US subsidiary of a major EU company that has been doing testing on tobacco product substrate for years. Some EU governments do regulate pesticides in tobacco products but they have a deal with the Cartel to keep it quiet and so nobody even realizes that it takes place, but German cigarettes are simply somehow almost pesticide-free. Like magic. Any American smoker who has ever gone to Germany and bought their same brand there, or any German smoker who ever does the same in the US, will know exactly what I’m talking about even though nobody has the true facts that would so easily explain the differences.
Testing cigarette tobacco for pesticide residues is far more complicated than testing Cannabis, which is the lab’s main business in the US, so being able to have this lab’s scientists collect and test random samples of tobacco products against their massive tobacco substrate database with their experience in doing so was real plus. To start things off, here are some of the results from just one brand of little cigar. The data in the right-hand column simply shows whether or not Oregon regulates those same substances on Cannabis.
Community Tobacco Control Partners Test Results 12/18
I’m getting more than a little tired of hearing the too-clever bullshit from self-serving agencies like FDA and from anti-smoking hustlers like Truth Initiativeclaiming that organic cigarettes aren’t safer than regular commercial cigarettes because all tobacco is equally hazardous. That’s either a deliberate lie or gross ignorance. They either actually know nothing about the tobacco industry, although they claim to be unimpeachable experts, or else they do know about the true nature of the health consequences of even the lowest levels of exposure to these bioactive xenobiotic chemicals and they are true co-conspirators in this atrocity. I am all about documenting and showing readers the evidence that the latter is tragically true. US regulatory agencies have been corrupted to the core by the Tobacco Cartel.
Here’s a look at the range of contamination smokers are exposed to with non-organic tobacco products. It’s pretty obvious that as you go lower in price you go up in exposure to a huge range of bioactive chemicals any one of which has potential health & life-threatening properties if inhaled often enough regardless of how tiny the amount – I’ll link you to that science after the table. But reflect a moment longer on this data and ask yourself – who are the markets for American Spirit Blues, Marlboro Reds, and Swisher Sweets? Who are the people smoking these brands? Why are there such big differences in the amounts and kinds of pesticides and insecticides affecting these different groups of people? Those questions all have hard evidence answers – and you can probably answer them yourself just by looking at these three brands.
After all, government at all levels and “non-profit” parasites like Truth Initiative are full partners in the revenues generated by tobacco products, and they have every reason to conceal the fact that they know that pesticides are a major, even primary and 100% preventable cause of smoking-related disease and death. The only reason pesticide residues are in tobacco products at all is because it is much more profitable and far more convenient for Tobacco Cartel companies to produce them that way than to make them cleaner and safer, and the only reason that nobody has called them on this atrocity is because they have spread so much money around in so many places for so many years. If you want to identify tobacco industry co-conspirators, or maybe just pathetic dupes, just look for the ones claiming that all tobacco products are equally hazardous, organic American Spirit and Swisher Sweets alike.
If around now you’re thinking “Well, some of those pesticides look pretty bad but those concentrations look awfully low to do any damage to smokers” please understand that science now knows that many of these designer chemicals are highly bioactive in human nerves, tissues and organs even at molecular levels.
“Toxic effects of pesticide mixtures at a molecular level: their relevance to human health”
The damage even goes well beyond the smoker. If your mother smoked a brand contaminated with DDT, which as you saw earlier was almost a certainty any time from 1950 – 1972, and you are a woman, then your odds of developing breast cancer are much, much higher as a result of what DDT in those cigarettes did to your mother’s DNA. That genetic damage is passed on to both female and male children across generations.
For peer-reviewed journal research on maternal DDT and Breast Cancer see also here and here andhere. Oh, and how about Obesity? If your mother was exposed to DDT while she was carrying you, your odds of uncontrollable obesity rise dramatically. Remember, smokers from 1950-1972 were probably universally exposed to DDT, and even if they quit during pregnancy there was more than enough DDT circulating in their bodies to damage you before you were even you. Every brand in those days was contaminated not just with DDT but with Endrin, Aldrin, Lindane, Dieldrin and literally dozens of other OC and OP pesticides. Remember those links to the 1950-72 research here and here andhere and here and here?
So please tell me – are there any differences worth mentioning between (non-organic) American Spirit, Marlboro and Swisher Sweets? Would tobacco cigarettes without these specific contaminants be safer than contaminated cigarettes. Prove it for yourself. Search for any one of these fungicides or insecticides listed above along with keywords like “neurological”, “fetal”, “diabetes”, “obesity”, “birth defect” or “cancer” and see what you get. As you’re looking at the results, ask yourself:
Is the least contaminated tobacco product safer than the most contaminated one, or not?
Even if you assume that the tobacco in all three brands is the same, which it isn’t, would you say there are differences in safety levels, or not?
If someone you love is smoking and you can’t get them to stop, which of the three brands above would you want them to smoke, and why?
If your kid is sneaking off and smoking, which of these brands would you least want them to be smoking, and why?
Looking at that hard data, only blind arrogance or a hidden agenda could continue to claim that the DDT, Carbendazim and Penconazole residues in the little cigars that kids are smoking right now, today, by the tens of thousands in every city in the US, doesn’t matter because tobacco itself is so bad anyway. Yet that is exactly what EPA, FDA, all the anti-smoking groups, and all the state health departments pretend to believe. That’s their excuse for doing nothing, and it’s pathetic. Here’s why.
First, there is zero research on the health effects of smoking uncontaminated tobacco products. No such study has ever been done. In addition, virtually all smoking and health research that used tobacco smoke obtained that smoke from “Research Standard” cigarettes supplied by the Tobacco Cartel itself, and with zero data on what pesticide residues were present in any of these “research” cigarettes. Please tell me any other area of research where the materials to be examined for their health impact are not completely characterized? No research study I have found, and I’ve looked pretty carefully, has ever acknowledged the presence of pesticide residues in the “tobacco” they were using to test the health effects of smoking tobacco.
So all statements about tobacco products begin with the unstated, unproven assumption, which is super-convenient for the Cartel, the government ‘regulators’, and the non-profit parasites, that tobacco is causing so much of the obvious harm that any damage being done by those insecticides and fungicides, that are absolutely necessary for the Tobacco Cartel to maximize profits, can safely be ignored. Not just ignored, but actively placed outside consideration or even public knowledge. In other words, concealed by conspiracy.
So then there’s alcohol. Alcohol products are certainly right up there with tobacco products in terms of the death, disease, personal and social costs and widespread suffering they cause, but you can bet that there would be an “all hands on deck” emergency alarm sent out if even a few of the pesticides we just found in tobacco products were found in beer or wine down at the mini-mart. We’ve all heard horror stories of contaminated alcohol products , usually bootleg, causing mass blindness and death, but think of just the pesticides you see in Marlboros (above) being found in a shipment of Bud Light? That contaminated shit would be pulled from the coolers instantly, and there would be lawsuits and congressional investigations. There would be no shrugging of shoulders and saying what the hell, alcohol is so bad for people anyway that a few pesticides don’t matter.
This level of self-serving deceitfulness while enormous numbers of people die from pesticide contaminated tobacco products every year, and while children around the world are sealing their future fates by being lured into smoking these cheap contaminated tobacco products, all of which is 100% preventable, is beyond disgusting.
The question that must be asked – if it were possible, wouldn’t the kids smoking this trash, idiots that they certainly are, be safer smoking these products if they were made from exactly the same crap as they are now, from trash and waste tobacco and cheap chemical flavorings but weren’t contaminated with those extremely hazardous pesticides we can all see in the hard data for the first time now?
We know that 1 in 13 of all the children under 17 alive today will die prematurely, painfully and expensively of “smoking-related” disease. That is a whole lot of children and future suffering. Do you think any of it could be prevented just by requiring tobacco manufacturers to remove pesticide residues from their tobacco?
They could do that, almost in a flash. Why don’t they? Because they don’t have to, and because it’s much more profitable to use chemicals than to use labor, even in the remote areas of the Third World where they grow their tobacco out of sight of regulators and inspectors.
The fact is that millions of future deaths can very likely be prevented by acting now to set reasonable standards for pesticide residues in tobacco products. Those standards exist – simply look at Oregon’s pesticide residue “Action Levels” for Cannabis, or the FDA’s own “Action Levels” for DDT in everything but tobacco. Everything.
Every tobacco product on the market could be made with organic tobacco – no problem. Give the industry 3-5 years and a drop-dead set of conditions and they will do whatever they have to do. It would take longer to actually become organic, but in 3-5 years the world tobacco supply could be 75% cleared of pesticide residues.
However as long as “players” like FDA and Truth Initiative and others like them play the “All Tobacco Is Equally Bad” game nothing will change. Of the total number of smokers dying each year, a significant number die because of the arrogant conceit of those who believe (or at least pretend to believe) they know all the truth there is to know about Tobacco when they have never once set foot in any tobacco field anywhere, much less a field that has just been sprayed with DDT inIndia, Nicaragua or Brazil. These countries supply hundreds of tons of contaminated tobacco waste to US manufacturers that they make into fruity little swee smokes for our kids.
And then in 2015 the moralists and parasites had the nerve to go after organic tobacco. The problem is that they apparently don’t know what Tobacco is, or really that much about it, because if they did they wouldn’t have gotten themselves into the really stupid trap of insisting for the record that there’s no difference between organic tobacco and severely contaminated tobacco. They may claim when finally confronted that they don’t know about all those pesticides, but they are on the record as fully informed.
Of course if they did admitthey have known about the pesticides all alongthen they would also have to admit culpability in 75 years of countless deaths and measureless suffering that could have been completely prevented by insisting on reasonable regulations on pesticide residues in tobacco products. The problem of organochlorine pesticides in heavy concentrations in tobacco products was first realized in the 1950’s, and was heavily documented through the 60s. There was testimony before the Senate calling specific attention to the problem. That issue quickly died in the US Senate of 1969.
Then in the 1970’s as smoking and health issues became a major public and scientific concern, the Tobacco industry realized it had a severe problem, and a nationwide lid was clamped on any research referring to pesticides in tobacco products. You can browse a few examples of the surviving tobacco/cigarette pesticide research on DDT and Organochlorine pesticides that virtually ended in the 1970s here and here and here andhere and here.
Some extremely limited research continued in other countries and has resulted in strict but reasonable laws regulating pesticide residues in tobacco products in a few countries – mostly in the EU. But in the US beginning in the 1970’s what research couldn’t be directly corrupted or subtly misdirected was subverted through strategies like the “Reference Cigarette” program.
That’s 50+ years of preventable deaths that lie at the feet of those who have been so fixed on hating what they believed was Tobacco that they never once stopped to ask if it was actually Tobacco they were hating.
But then in 2015 they scored what they thought was a face-saving victory – they got RJR to go public and say the words – organic tobacco does not mean a safer cigarette. They finally got payback for years of feeling powerless in the face of the whole tobacco industry. unfortunately, we know that FDA was only able to force RJR to agree to their lies because RJR didn’t want to have to defend American Spirit organic by showing WHY American Spirit organic cigarettes are safer. They are safer because they aren’t drenched with pesticides like every other commercial tobacco brand, including every other RJR brand besides organic American Spirit.
Notice that in the data tables above even the regular American Spirit Blue non-organic brand is lower in pesticides than the Marlboro or another RJR brand, Camel. That’s a big difference in safety levels even among non-organic brands, much less between organic and non-organic. However, if RJR had defended American Spirit organic tobacco on that simple evidence-based premise then they would have had to admit how contaminated all their other products are, and why. Oops! That’s a non-starter. Think of the lawsuits!
So it was a much, much better deal for RJR to let FDA pretend they scored a big win, just like years before the Surgeon General’s warnings were a godsend to tobacco manufacturers. It let them say – hey, you were warned. The so-called “Tobacco Settlement” was an even bigger fraud – look at what is actually being done with all that money. Lots of “Tobacco is really really bad” advertising, lots of huge salaries and nice perks, everybody congratulating themselves on what a great job they’re doing, and no change in the numbers of people suffering and dying, or in the number of kids heading down that dead-end road.
Until my little non-profit finally got funding and was able to begin testing tobacco products in late 2018, not one dime has ever been spent by the “anti-tobacco” forces to test for these contaminants that by themselves make these products illegal, period. But then the “Tobacco is really really bad” game would be over, wouldn’t it. Imagine the public reaction if it became clear that people in positions of responsibility and authority had known about pesticide contamination of tobacco products for many smokers’ lifetimes and had never once spoken out.
FDA knows what it has to do in return for being allowed to look like a winner in the organic tobacco derby. Their part of the deal is not to make too much noise about all those “crop protection agents”. That’s what the industry calls pesticides. After all, crops need protection, right? so much better than a nasty word ending in “cide”.
FDA and the anti-tobacco PR and advertising shills are allowed to beat the drums and make up endless variations of the “Tobacco Is So Bad” meme because that doesn’t hurt the tobacco industry one bit, but it does allow thousands of people to keep doing extremely dubious work to justify their lucrative titles and careers “fighting tobacco”.
Ever wonder why FDA is being so helpful in the industry’s pivot away from tobacco and toward e-cigarettes? Are they are all hoping that their complicity in 75 years of slaughter for profit will just slide on out of sight? Yes, complicity. FDA has had institutional knowledge of the presence of heavy concentrations of hazardous pesticides in tobacco products for over 50 years and has not once, ever brought it up in any hearings or testimony or research. That’s complicity.
I call the tobacco industry’s reckless, negligent, criminal behavior “slaughter for profit” simply because the tobacco industry doesn’t have to use pesticides at all. Traditional tobacco growers used hand labor for hundreds of years and did just fine. The tobacco companies use chemicals in place of labor strictly for increased profits and they have rigged the regulatory systems of the world so that they are protected from the consequences of their greed-driven decisions.
No matter. I’m here to call bullshit right now with simple hard evidence. AKA facts. You decide.
Check the data below after you read the following incredible weasel-statements and then you tell me:
Are these bureaucrats full of shit or not?
Are some tobacco products safer than others, or not?
Should people who smoke be protected from these contaminants, or do they deserve whatever happens to them?
If these chemicals were in wine or beer, would that be OK just because alcohol is known to be so hazardous to health anyway.
Does it not matter that the most hazardous of these brands, the one with 375 times the highest background level of DDT, is the one that most kids 11-16 love?
“Because use of tobacco products, with or without pesticide residues, is so hazardous to health, all of the Oregon Health Authority’s efforts around tobacco are aimed at discouraging use of tobacco products and encouraging cessation of tobacco use in people already using it.” Oregon Health Authority 2018
“EPA does not assess intermediate or long-term risks of pesticide residues to smokers because of the severity of health effects linked to use of tobacco products themselves.” EPA 2018
“Organic,” “natural” or “additive-free” product labels may imply a healthier or safer choice, but that couldn’t be further from the truth when it comes to tobacco products. A cigarette with organic tobacco or tobacco with no additives does not make it healthier or safer than other cigarettes.” Truth Initiative 2018
No differences at all? Really?
Notice the array of fungicides in the tables below, marked in red. If you’re familiar with HIV/AIDS therapy,think what inhaling these fungicides is doing to young patients who smoke – a very large proportion of this group of mostly young people. HIV/AIDS patients who smoke during recombinant drug therapy almost always fail to respond. There’s an absolute fungicide-failure connection ( see here andhere and here) but it’s totally missed, and the tragedy is that simply by switching to organic cigarettes people going through treatment would not be exposing themselves to hidden cigarette fungicides. Ask any clinician – could that make a difference? Not inhaling a cocktail of fungicides 600X a day during HIV/AIDS drug treatment, even if the patient continues smoking?
Think of what the worldwide effects on fungicide resistance will be from the exposure of millions of smokers to this fungicide cocktail. Concerned about fungal resistance? Look at tobacco products and consider how simple it would be to produce tobacco organically, or at least to some reasonable standards. And people really do have the right to know. So if you want to know, and if you enjoy web searching, just copy and paste the name of any of the pesticides in this table into a search bar with the word “neurological” or ‘endocrine’ or ‘epigenetic’ or ‘fetal’ or ‘pregnancy’ or ‘reproductive’ or ‘diabetes’ or ‘autism’ … You get the idea. When you do this – well, I’ll let you find out. and when you do, keep in mind that not only are smokers inhaling that pesticide 600 times a day, but they are also inhaling every other pesticide shown in that brand 600 times a day, and also there are many more pesticide residues in each brand that are below the limits of detection but that operate at the molecular level so the fact that they can’t be detected doesn’t mean they aren’t there.
By the way, the references to Oregon Cannabis pesticide residue standards in these tables are because these original pesticide residue tests were run in Portland and the comparisons of Tobacco products with Cannabis are meaningful in a legal context. Oregon Cannabis growers & sellers are the victims of overt discrimination by regulations that force them to comply with pesticide residue limits on their products while their principle competitors go completely unregulated because of their political and economic influence and can therefore produce and sell their product at an unfair competitive advantage due to these anti-competitive and unfair Federal and State regulations.
Pesticide Residue Test Sample #1 Multnomah County, Oregon Received 12/13/2018 from Columbia Food Labs/Pixis contact: billdrake4470@gmail.com
Oregon Cannabis Action Levels (PPM) – A Reasonable Standard?
I’ll skip the long, long back story and get right to the point. If you’ve been looking for a way that individuals and small groups of people acting on their own initiative can control dangerous tobacco products at the local level, this is it. Here’s wishing you a successful 2019.
I recently had a number of off-the-shelf tobacco brands tested for pesticide residues. This was the first time this has been done in the US, in spite of the massive amounts of tax and private money spent every year on so-called “tobacco control and prevention”.
In this post I’m including hard evidence showing the concentration of illegal, totally banned DDT I found on the most popular brand of sweet & fruity little cigars, Swisher Sweets – the top choice among low-income, Black and Hispanic teens. They are also arguably the most toxic piece of shit in the whole pile of toxic shit that this rat pack of corporate criminals sells to kids. Don’t get me wrong – I found extreme pesticide contamination on many of the brands I tested – it’s just that the little cigars stood way out at the top of the contamination chart.
Don’t just take my word for the toxicity of little cigars – the University of North Carolina conducted an extensive study in 2016 comparing the toxicity of little cigar smoke, including swisher Sweets, compared with cigarette smoke. This study was also the first of its kind, just like my pesticide residue study. The North Carolina researchers found detailed hard evidence that little cigars are extremely toxic and are particularly dangerous to young, Black, and Latino smokers compared with cigarettes. (This study, combined with the hard evidence I’m sharing in this post, will blow your mind if you care about mass poisoning of innocent children.)
The one area that this North Carolina study missed was the key role that pesticide residues play in tobacco product toxicity. Like every other scientific and medical study before them, these researchers totally failed to account for pesticide contamination in the tobacco products they tested, and so they were understandably puzzled by the extreme levels of toxicity they found.
However, once you factor in pesticide contamination, the whole picture emerges clearly. The North Carolina data makes sense. It’s the differences in the pesticide burdens of different types of tobacco products that account for the differences in toxicity among types of tobacco products. That’s why it’s so important for local communities to understand the nature of this hidden threat to their children.
I found actionable levels of many different pesticide residues in all the tobacco products I just tested, including several cigarette brands popular with kids. But the overall pesticide contamination of Tobacco products, which regulators manage to ignore, isn’t the key point here. The key point for tobacco product control at the local level is that these little cigar/DDT results are not only grim news for smokers but flat out violate the law.
It is illegal to sell any product contaminated with this level of DDT anywhere in the US. and much of the world. Only soil or water-residual DDT is allowed in any food, beverage, cosmetic or other consumer product, and there is no way that the level I found could occur as a residual from soil or water – it was sprayed on the tobacco used to make this product, and it was sprayed recently. (See commentary below the data.)
The DDT concentration shown below is 700+ times the highest level found anywhere in the entire US food chain from lingering soil or water contamination, and I will guarantee that a sampling of 100 such products will yield similarly shocking results.
So here’s my suggestion. Take this data on your phone to your health department. Show them the DDT levels. Tell them that the same little cigar products are being sold at the mini-mart. (They are.)
But here’s the beauty of the hard evidence I’m offering. It doesn’t matter if your local health officials think they can regulate tobacco products specifically or not. It doesn’t matter if they think have the authority to regulate tobacco products or not. Unless they are somehow forbidden to investigate and take action in cases of toxic substance contamination in consumer products being sold to children in your county, they do have the authority to act. You may have to make them act by going to the School Board, the District Attorney, and your local media, but they do have the authority to act locally and independently on high-level DDT contamination of anything in your community – period.
These contaminated tobacco products are illegal not because they are tobacco products; they are illegal because they are consumer products contaminated with hazardous concentrations of extremely hazardous, totally banned pesticide chemicals that will be emitted when they are used as intended by the manufacturer.
If you enjoy a sweet irony, I can guarantee that when all the testing is done, most of the premium cigars that the 1% love will turn out to be the most highly contaminated of all. Although some premium cigar tobacco growers still use traditional methods, and grow tobacco without industrial chemicals, I’m quite certain that most premium cigars will prove to be far more contaminated than the cheap little cigars the busboys out behind that five-star restaurant have to smoke.
Pesticide Residue Test Sample #1 Multnomah County, Oregon Received 12/13/2018
** Relevant to risk assessment for these “Little Cigars”; the highest levels of DDT p, p- in all foods tested by FDA in their comprehensive “Total Diet Reports” for 2017, were for catfish filets and for frozen potato fries. The 2.17 ng/g potatoes and 2.3 ng/g levels expressed in the FDA “Total Diet Study” are the equivalents of 0.00217 mg/kg for potatoes and 0.0023 mg/kg for catfish. compared with 0.816 mg/kg in the single little cigar sample tested. Based on my knowledge of tobacco industry practices, additional testing will show serious levels of OCP and other classes of pesticide contamination particularly on tobacco products in the “discount” and low-price market segments and, as we will see, in the premium cigar market segment as well.
I know for certain that as we test other tobacco products, especially the cheap ones, we’ll find stuff that makes DDT look like a hint of mint. However, this data is right now, and approximately 800,000 children between 11-15 are smoking this particular brand of little cigar every day and inhaling every one of the pesticides listed.
But even if the only contaminant were the 0.816 mg/kg (or 816 mcg/kg) DDT ….
“Average adult intakes of DDT were estimated to be 62 µg/person/day (1000 micrograms = 1 milligram) in 1965 and 240 µg/person/day in 1970, before the DDT ban was instituted. The FDA Total Diet Studies show that the daily intakes have fallen since the ban, with daily intakes (for a 16-year-old, 70 kg male) averaging 6.51, 2.38, 1.49, and 0.97 µg/person/day for 1978–1979, 1979–1980, 1984–1986, and 1986–1991, respectively.” https://ntp.niehs.nih.gov/ntp/htdocs/chem_background/exsumpdf/ddt_508.pdf
“Based on all of the evidence available, the Department of Health and Human Services has determined that DDT is reasonably anticipated to be a human carcinogen. Similarly, the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) has determined that DDT is possibly carcinogenic to humans. EPA has determined that DDT, DDE, and DDD are probable human carcinogens.”
It was at least partly from the hidden and unaccounted-for pesticides, which were overlooked in this study as they have been overlooked in virtually every American scientific and medical study of “tobacco” smoke. Little cigars are far more contaminated with far more toxic “crop protection agents” than cigarettes because of differences in how the tobacco is raised, and in how much highly contaminated tobacco manufacturing waste is used in making the product.
We laugh at the silly idea of Cannabis as a “killer weed” now, but millions believed it and happily allowed the government to send generations of people to prison because they believed it. It seems absurd that anyone would be fooled by that ham-handed government propaganda, but millions were and many still are.
Keeping mind that what has happened in the past could happen again, and could be happening right now, let me ask you to consider this:
What if there is a much more subtle and sophisticated generations-long campaign of disinformation about Tobacco just like there was about Cannabis? What if it’s run by a powerful industry with endless money and not by a bunch of clueless bureaucrats thinking up stupid slogans. What if the motive is a combination of profit and fear – immense profit from what they’re secretly doing, and deep fear of the liability if what they’re doing is revealed? What if the Tobacco industry has known for a long time that it has a severe, possibly fatal problem that it has managed to keep completely out of public view by spending vast sums of money on a combination of public persuasion and widespread, carefully targeted (but increasingly visible) official, scientific and medical corruption?
What if some or even most of the damage being caused in the modern world by commercial Tobacco products is not being caused by the Tobacco in those products but by previously unidentified hazardous toxic substances IN the tobacco products, and what if that means that these hazardous toxic substances in tobacco products can be controlled at the local level using existing local and state ordinances and laws? The hazardous substances in question are pesticides that are highly regulated and even banned in every other kind of product that people consume but – unbelievably – they are not regulated or inspected for in tobacco products. They are allowed by default by EPA, FDA, USDA, CDC, FTC, CPSC, and every other Federal agency. The Tobacco Cartel has controlled them all since the 1970s when all government research on pesticides in tobacco products ceased forever. You have never heard a word about pesticides in tobacco products, for all the Billions spent on “smoking and health” and “anti-smoking” and “anti-tobacco” programs and campaigns. That’s because there actually is a conspiracy, and its in plain sight – the very best place to totally conceal something.
I know that’s it’s a heresy to talk about controlling toxic substances in the tobacco products instead of the tobacco products themselves, but fair-minded people will consider the actual evidence and not rest on an unquestioned assumption: maybe it’s not the tobacco in the tobacco products that’s killing most of the people. It’s really no different that realizing that it’s better for addicts to inject drugs with clean needles and then make them available. You may not like the fact that people are smoking tobacco, but at least you can ensure that the manufacturers aren’t allowed to harm and exploit them with negligence and greed.
A Quick Review Of Some Hard Evidence
Here are a few of my posts with hard data on cigarette pesticides revealed by lab tests I commissioned in 2018 and with links to peer-reviewed research demonstrating the depth of the health hazards presented by these hidden contaminants.
After you have a chance to check out this set of links I would like to return to the topic of this post – what communities can do without “help’ from Federal bureaucrats to protect themselves from this public health threat.
This post links hard data on DDT in Swisher Sweets brand of little cigars, smokers by millions of young women, with peer-reviewed publushed research on pre-natal genetic damage to the baby
This post links hard data on hidden fungicides in tobacco brands popular in marginalized communities with peer-reviewed published research that demonstrates that exposure to these same fungicides is strongly associated with testicular cancer
This post offers hard evidence and historic documentation of the conspiratorial role of Federal agencies in concealing the health threat to smokers created by unregulated pesticide exposure
Any exposure to several of the pesticides shown to contaminate tobacco products are proven to have greater impact on babies with Latinx, African American, American Indian and Pacific Island genetics.
Could the unexplained link between smoking and suicide could be explained by the known link between pesticide exposure and suicide, once you become aware of the heavy concealed pesticide contamination in cigarettes?
A radical “quit smoking” plan that will probably offend a lot of non-smokers but that could help a lot of Diabetic smokers quit hurting themselves without having to quit.
This post examines the evidence of the link between mother’s exposure to DDT (like in Swisher Sweets) and their daughter’s lifetime risk of breast cancer. It’s huge.
The very foundation of the anti-tobacco, anti-smoking faith is that “Tobacco Is Bad Shit”. That’s the firm, unquestioning belief, and every tobacco prevention and control effort in the world is pinned to that article of faith. Tobacco causes illness and death. End of discussion. No questions. Full stop. We already know that Tobacco is bad shit, and we don’t want to hear any more about it. So let’s just move on and figure out how we can keep people from smoking and now vaping the goddamned stuff!
OK, but what if everybody is wrong? Really – what if everyone thinks things are one way, when they are actually another? Is that possible? What if people are all looking in one direction while the answer lies in another? Has there ever been that kind of mass delusion in history? Of course there has been – that’s a central theme in the history of science. People believe something fundamental for generations. It’s obviously wrong, but nobody can see it. The first one who points this out is attacked. Others speak up and say wait a minute, we should check this out and see if it’s true. They do, and it is. And then everybody says “Whocoulddaknowed?”
The oldest example of “everybody knows” is the flat earth delusion that ruled western minds for centuries. Maps showed the edges of the earth. Then one day – Oops! It’s round. Whocoulddaknowed? Then next the all-powerful church decided to burn heretics who pointed out simple, hard evidence that the world rotated rather than the heavens turning. Everyone knew that the earth was the center of the universe and that everything in God’s heavens rotated around God’s earth. Then one day – Oops! Whocoulddaknowed? It took the church centuries to apologize to Galileo. I doubt he cared. Then everyone laughed at the idea of invisible bugs causing disease because everyone knows it’s the vapors. Mal Aria. Oops! Again. Really? Whocoulddaknowed? Little invisible bugs. Well I’ll be damned.
Most of us scoff at that kind of profound ignorance as if we were invulnerable to the same folly. But I’m telling anyone who will listen – it’s not the tobacco that is sickening and killing millions. It turns.
I realize that tying those profound historical delusions to a delusion about Tobacco, even if it could be demonstrated, may seem trivial in comparison, but if anything the effect of the delusion about Tobacco has had greater impact on human life than any of those mass delusions just cited. That’s because of our profound collective delusions about tobacco, carefully cultivated by the tobacco industry to shield itself from accountability, have allowed millions of completely preventable deaths in the past and the dying will continue long into the future because of our willful collective ignorance.
The last words attributed to Jesus were “Father forgive them. They know not what they do.” I have always believed that Jesus was using those last words not to comment for all eternity on those who were killing him, and the evil Romans in general, but on the one thing most responsible for the suffering and death of mankind.
So, I’ll ask again, what if most of the damage being caused by Tobacco products is actually being caused by pesticide residues that contaminate the Tobacco products? The tobacco products, the manufactured crap, not tobacco itself. What if smoking tobacco, just tobacco, no contaminants, is OK? Gasp.
Here’s the thing. We know for sure that pesticide chemicals do exactly what they’re designed to do. They interrupt nerve transmissions, they destroy DNA, they poison internal organs, they mutate little bug babies – these chemical industry scientists, working dead-center in the traditions of the Nazi nerve gas experiments, are endlessly creative. So in the end, it really doesn’t matter whether tobacco is bad or not – we know that pesticides are “bad” for sure. They are “xenobiotics” – substances “hostile to life”. But so many people are so tied up arguing the evils of Tobacco so passionately and hatefully that they don’t see themselves as precise parallels with the Middle Ages “angels on the head of a pin” debate that consumed generations of “wise men”, while the Tobacco companies, like the wealthy classes that actually ran the Medieval Church for their own benefit, are snickering all the way to the bank.
All this may sound depressingly true and impossible to overcome, but not so. There are laws in place in every community to deal with pesticides as toxic substances, although those laws have been rigged by the pesticide manufacturers to cover what they thought was every contingency. Nothing in the Tobacco Master Settlement, or in any other shields the Cartel has erected, can protect them from liability for concealing their longstanding material knowledge of a clear, present danger to smokers and their children.
That’s the beauty of understanding that there are xenobiotic substances ON the tobacco products. It doesn’t matter what you think about tobacco itself, or even what laws and ordinances and regulations say about “tobacco” itself. Hate it or love it – doesn’t matter. These are products, and they are contaminated with known toxic and dangerous substances, and they violate all kinds of laws on that basis. If you love Tobacco, you should care. If you hate Tobacco, you should care. Pesticide-free tobacco products would be a major improvement in the life of a community regardless.
So there really doesn’t have to be any argument at all about whether or not tobacco is bad and should be controlled – some of the pesticides on the tobacco products being sold in your community are flat illegal and there are available legal remedies that the law says MUST be applied. Take that to the bank – and to your health department. and don’t let them stonewall you about “lack of authority to regulate tobacco products” – they have the authority and the duty to protect the public from pesticide exposure. They have never used it before this way, and they probably haven’t ever thought about it, but if a barrel of Cypermethrin suddenly falls from the sky into the WalMart parking lot you can bet they won’t be sitting around wondering who is going to handle it. If somebody lets loose a can of DDT in a schoolyard you can bet that the local authorities aren’t going to just call the poison hotline and then wait around. Communities can act when they are in immediate peril, and high concentrations of banned pesticide residues in tobacco products being smoked by children in the community meets that definition in spades.
Pesticides fall into a class of chemicals defined as “toxic substances” in a wide range of environmental and consumer protection regulations and statutes. In every state, there are statutes that empower local, county-level health officials to act when toxic substances threaten local public health. Yes there are pre-emption laws that forbid local communities from imposing greater restrictions on pesticides than state laws do, but in this case we’re talking about local communities using existing state laws on toxic substances in consumer products that, if detected at the any level, can trigger local action by public health authorities without waiting for permission from the state. This strategy may need tweaking in many communities, but because state and federal lawmakers have been incredibly (and perhaps in some cases deliberately) sloppy in writing tobacco product regulations I believe that tobacco product pesticide contamination opens a big wide door for local control.
In Oregon where I live, the credible allegation of the presence of banned “toxic substances” on any property located in the community is supposed to trigger mandatory regulatory responses if the allegation is properly made and supported by evidence. “Property” includes tobacco products sitting on the shelf down at the mini-mart. I’m currently working on educating our local public health administrator on her authority to act in this area.
In most jurisdictions I’ve looked at in California, Colorado, and other Cannabis-legal states, a broad range of “Property” is subject to “toxic substance” regulatory oversight by County public health authorities.
I can hear the screams from the faithful now – but, but Tobacco is so bad that it doesn’t matter if there’s poison on the leaves! I would only ask the faithful – can you point to one scientific research study that compares the smoke or vapor of 100% pure, organic Tobacco with any Tobacco product on the market? There are none. Zero. And, that’s not one of those famous “distinctions without a difference”. Please think about that – if actual, real Tobacco smoke or vapor has never been tested, and if every report of toxic substances in “tobacco” smoke has been based on rigged “reference cigarettes” supplied by the industry itself, where does that leave the idea that, without any question, Tobacco is horrible, awful, dangerous stuff? It may be true, but there are no studies that prove it one way or another.
Since 1970 virtually every “scientific” study of tobacco products has used industry-supplied “reference cigarettes” that don’t give results relevant to either what is really on the commercial market or to organic or even simply leaf tobacco. At least 25% of those “reference cigarettes” are “reconstituted tobacco”, a synthetic product made from a highly variable mix of tobacco stems, stalks and factory-floor waste called “tobacco dust”. There is no way that the results of smoke stream or vapor stream analysis using “reference cigarettes” has anything to do with tobacco in pure form. I know that anti-tobacco advocates would fear that the results of such testing might clear Tobacco’s name and give people who like to smoke and vape a license to do so. But so what?
I would say to them, if it turns out that it isn’t the Tobacco but the pesticides, since the pesticides are a very controllable harm while people smoking and vaping are not controllable, then forget about your dislike of Tobacco and deal with the problem. Or , I would also ask them, do you secretly agree with that renegade government bureaucrat in the 1920’s who arranged to have bootleg whiskey poisoned with methanol in order to scare people into not drinking? Do you think, I would ask, that this was actually a pretty good idea and those drinkers deserved what they got? Or maybe you aren’t that cold-hearted and simply think that alcohol is so bad anyway, and those drinkers were poisoning themselves anyway, so what’s the big deal?
I would ask them these questions because any person who felt so strongly about alcohol that they would ignore the deliberate poisoning of drinkers by the government wouldn’t be worried about a few pesticides in Tobacco products. By the same reasoning, Tobacco is so bad anyway – who cares about pesticides?
Think that an example from the 1920’s, a hundred years ago, is a bit irrelevant to today’s enlightened government? Well, remember Paraquat on Marijuana? The DEA came right out and said that regardless of what it did to Marijuana smokers, they were engaged in illegal activity and so it didn’t matter. Besides, from the government’s point of view, a few dead hippies weren’t worth getting worked up over. The idea that was sold to the public is clearly that Marijuana is so bad anyway who cares if the government poisons it – after all, they’re just trying to keep precious little American children from being lured into a life of degradation and crime.
Workers apply fungicide “Ditio carbamato” to cigar tobacco in Nicaragua every 4 days
So what I’m saying is that the only fair and reasonable way to determine the truth, the relative degree of actual risk, would be to compare (1) commercial tobacco products with (2) organic tobacco smoke and vapor. Otherwise all that science on smoking, and all those horrible components of “tobacco” smoke and vapor, aren’t actually testing “tobacco” smoke or vapor at all. They are testing “Tobacco product” vapor and smoke, and most Tobacco products in America have no relationship to real Tobacco leaf. Again, a distinction with a big difference.
One more heretical question, if you’re with me so far. What if those toxic substances are in Tobacco products for one reason only – because it is more profitable for Tobacco product manufacturers to use these chemicals in Tobacco production than to produce Tobacco without them? Almost as an aside, premium cigars are among the most severely contaminated Tobacco products in the world, because the growers spare no expense in applying pesticides, fungicides and every other kind of chemical to keep bugs and worms
from eating holes in those incredibly valuable cigar wrapper leaves. And why do they do that? Simple, again. It’s the money. A Tobacco leaf with bug holes can’t be used for making premium cigars, so once a bug takes a bite that leaf turns from gold into plain old shit.
Tobacco products aren’t contaminated with pesticide residues because the growers and manufacturers want to poison their customers; they’re contaminated because everybody makes more money by using these chemicals and they aren’t being forced to clean up their products, so millions of people are dying just like the bugs and worms in the Tobacco fields. It’s really that simple.
The Tobacco industry has produced organic Tobacco products, with no pesticide residue contamination. It knows how. It simply chooses not to. That cost/benefit decision alone impoverishes and drives the loss of millions of lives every year with immeasurable suffering and grief.
Pretty damned grim, right? Well, maybe not.
All it took to bring down Al Capone was one little charge of income tax evasion, and he wasn’t nearly the magnitude of monster these Tobacco companies are. Al thought he was riding pretty high too. Fancy suits. Expensive wine. Hookers. Blow. The best of everything. But he overlooked that one little crime, and that was enough.
Who in your County public health structure has the regulatory authority to order inspection of commercial products that are credibly suspected of being contaminated with the residues of banned pesticides?
Insist that they forget you are talking about Tobacco products.
Ask them what their action would be if you were coming to them with evidence that imported scented candles, or air fresheners, or incense being sold in your community were contaminated with these same pesticides at these same levels?
Geiss, O., Kotzias, D. – Determination of Ammonium, Urea and Pesticide Residues in Cigarette Tobacco. Fresenius Environmental Bulletin (FEB), No. 12 (2003), 1562– 1565
What would they do if they knew that children in the community were going to be inhaling vapors of Endosulfan, 4,4-DDE and Heptachlor over 100 times a day in homes where adults burned these candles?
How about if the issue was air fresheners contaminated with those same nerve toxins? Or maybe incense from China or India full of Chlordane?
What would they do if Tobacco products at the local mini-mart had the same contaminants as the cigarettes on the list you see here.
Oh, and about this cigarette pesticide data being from 2003? See my recent blog post with the Tobacco industry’s own data that shows these same pesticides – and about 100 more – still present on Tobacco worldwide in 2018. Show that data to your county public health department too.
If these two little bits of “income tax evasion” evidence aren’t enough to give your County public health officer “reasonable cause” to order inspection of commercial Tobacco products being sold in your County, let me know.
I’m doing some Tobacco product testing right now (12/18) in three of Oregon’s premier testing labs, and I plan to make the results available as part of a community-level Tobacco product control program.
Local communities have deferred too long to State and federal bureaucrats to protect them from Tobacco products. Simple residue testing of commercial tobacco products being sold in your community will give you ample evidence to insist that your local public health officials use their existing authority to enforce toxic substances regulations against contaminated Tobacco products for sale in your community.
If your community doesn’t have existing qualified pesticide residue testing labs, and most don’t, get in touch and ask for no-cost assistance from the Oregon Community Tobacco Control Partnership.
Highwaymen in the Middle Ages gave travelers a choice – they could hand over their cash and all their possessions, or they could hand over their life. At least those criminals gave their victims a choice.
Big tobacco wants both. “They just keep lining up for a smoke, so we grab ’em, drain ’em, and toss ’em aside – there’s plenty more coming down the highway. “
This post offers you an inside look at how Big Tobacco spreads its money around to buy scientists and regulators in order to create meaningless tobacco regulations based on purposely faked science so they can say “See, we’re playing by the rules, so you can’t touch us.”
Well, I do believe that Big Tobacco has outsmarted itself with its attempt to move smokers away from smoking and into vaporizing. That’s because in order to accomplish this massive feat of social engineering Big Tobacco has inadvertently revealed some things about their industrial practices that will, when clearly understood, point directly to their massive corporate crimes.
This post is an excerpt from a World Health Organization internal document titled: “Tobacco Company Strategies to Undermine Tobacco Control Activities at the World Health Organization”. This 250 page report reveals the extent of Big Tobacco’s subversion, corruption, intimidation and seduction of scientists, regulators, institutions, and anti-tobacco efforts worldwide. WHO estimates that by 2050 Big Tobacco will have killed 1 Billion people in its rampage, and this is a detailed look at how it has managed to accomplish the miracle of killing millions of people for profit and never being held criminally accountable.
This courageous and powerful report reveals in great detail the remarkable efforts Big Tobacco makes to cover its tracks, and it seems pretty clear that the only reason it would go to that enormous trouble and expense would be if they knew that if the truth about what they are really up to were to get out there, and if the truth could break through all that very expensive social engineering they’ve been doing for decades, they would all be doing the CNN perpwalk.
The reason this is relevant to a blog on Coca and Cannabis is that if you look closely at the methods Big Tobacco has used to systematically subvert scientists and government agencies worldwide to protect itself and pursue its goals, you can explain a lot of otherwise puzzling and inconsistent things about the American “War on Drugs”. After you read the following excerpt, and maybe the whole WHO report, see if you don’t agree with me that the “War on Drugs” has had the smell of Big Tobacco all over it since the 1970’s.
THE REPORT, Section Seven: “Subverting Science And Health”
Distorting WHO Research
Tobacco companies have a long history of distorting science to oppose restrictions on tobacco. Some of the tactics the tobacco companies have used for decades to manipulate the scientific and public debate include:
1. Secretly Funding Speakers at WHO Conferences
Tobacco companies have attempted to influence the tone and content of WHO- sponsored scientific conferences by paying “independent” scientists to attend and present papers. For example, Japan Tobacco Inc. (JTI) planned to pay 40 scientists to “present ‘neutral’ papers” at the 6th World Health Conference on Smoking or Health held in Japan in 1987.117 JTI calculated that the 40 scientists they would plant at the conference would exert significant influence:
“J.T.I. is trying to change the very nature and tone of the conference through these efforts.”118
INFOTAB, too, planned to encourage the submission of papers favorable to tobacco companies to the 6th WCToH.119
JTI also planned to get a scientific foundation controlled by tobacco companies (SRFS) involved as a member of the Academic Committee for the conference, to permit JTI to participate in the screening of papers for the conference:
“If the SRFS can send members to this committee, ‘neutral’ papers could be submitted to the conference.”120
2. Holding Scientific Symposia to Promote Pro-Industry Positions, with Tobacco Companies’ Role Concealed
As part of its campaign to undermine the IARC ETS study, tobacco companies arranged for several symposia on ETS at which speakers chosen for views consistent with the tobacco companies’ position would present papers. Tobacco company sponsorship of some of these symposia was concealed or minimized. Some of these conferences were primarily sponsored by tobacco company front organizations, such as Healthy Buildings International and CIAR.121 The views expressed at the symposia were disseminated by tobacco companies as “independent” scientific viewpoints.122
3. Misrepresenting Tobacco Company Work as WHO- Supported
In an apparent attempt to enhance the credibility of a tobacco company-sponsored ETS conference, industry officials widely misrepresented the conference as WHO- sponsored, based on the attendance at the conference of a single WHO official.123
4. Using “Independent” Consultants with Concealed Tobacco Company Ties to Lobby WHO Scientists
Echoing its use of front organizations as surrogates, tobacco companies have used outside scientists with concealed tobacco company ties to approach and lobby WHO on scientific questions related to tobacco.
5. Contacting WHO Study Scientists to Influence Study Results
As part of their plan to undermine the IARC ETS study, tobacco companies set out to establish contacts with the study investigators and collaborators.124 With some exceptions,125 the tobacco companies arranged to have contacts made through outside scientists acting as tobacco company consultants.126 The tobacco company affiliation of the consultants who contacted the IARC investigators was frequently concealed.127 These contacts with IARC scientists were to be used to gather “the best information about the status and likely findings of the study,”128 convince study investigators of the weaknesses of the IARC study,129 and, ultimately, achieve “the objective of no report or a report which draws mild conclusions from its data.”130
Through their contacts with IARC investigators and collaborators the tobacco companies were successful in gaining a large amount of information about the design and conduct of the study. More importantly, they were able to gain confidential information about preliminary study results and about how the study was likely to be interpreted. The tobacco companies were not able to influence the outcome of the study, however.
6. Presenting Tobacco Company Arguments Through “Independent” Scientists with Concealed Tobacco Company Ties
Tobacco companies’ scientific consultants have also lobbied WHO on scientific issues without revealing their tobacco company ties. For example, Peter Lee, a tobacco company consultant, wrote to the Director-General of WHO,131 apparently at BAT’s request, providing a lengthy criticism of a WHO study of mortality from tobacco use. In his letter, Lee described himself as “an independent statistician/epidemiologist who has followed the literature on smoking and health very closely for over 20 years.” He did not disclose any tobacco industry affiliations.132
7. Compromising Independence and Credibility of WHO Studies by Involving Investigators in Tobacco Company Research or Activities
Tobacco companies, through their front organization CIAR, attempted to involve IARC and its investigators in collaborative ventures. These ventures included (1) using IARC investigators to conduct studies on ETS confounders that could be used by tobacco companies to challenge the IARC study, (2) offering research grants to IARC investigators, and (3) offering to put an IARC investigator on CIAR’s advisory board.133
According to the study coordinator, IARC itself did not pursue any proposed collaboration once IARC became aware of CIAR’s tobacco company connections.134 One IARC collaborator did, however, conduct a study for CIAR on confounders. The tobacco companies’ purpose in using an IARC collaborator was almost certainly to undermine the IARC study results by attempting to produce evidence, under the name of one of IARC’s own investigators, that would undercut the study.
Tobacco companies conducted and publicly promoted a large number of studies, conferences, and literature reviews on ETS that were designed to challenge the validity of the IARC ETS study. These activities were generally carried out through third parties to create the appearance that the data and opinions were independent of tobacco industry influence.
The data from these studies were used successfully by industry officials when the IARC study results were released to cast doubt on the study. For example, the Sunday Telegraph cited the tobacco company-financed studies as evidence that:
“Passive smokers inhale the equivalent of just six cigarettes a year from other people’s smoke, according to the largest ever study of actual exposure levels of non-smokers. The figure, which undermines previous warnings about the dangers of passive smoking, is a thousand times lower than that faced by direct smokers, and so tiny that it could not be measured statistically.”135
8. Creating an Ostensibly Independent Coalition of Scientists
Tobacco companies sought to create an ostensibly independent coalition of scientists in Europe to help criticize the IARC study and other scientific studies used to support tobacco control policies.136 Like The Advancement of Sound Science Coalition (TASSC) created by Philip Morris and a public relations firm in the US, the European group would appear to be independent but would be initiated and funded by tobacco companies and by other industries.137
The committee of experts was unable to determine the success of this plan. Ong and Glantz have reported, however, that the likely outcome of this initiative was the European Science and Environment Forum (ESEF),138 although ESEF claims to receive little or no tobacco industry funding.139 ESEF has listed on its website at least two working papers criticizing the IARC ETS study, and the methods used in ETS epidemiological studies.140 Lorraine Moody, ESEF’s “key contact,”141 wrote an opinion piece in the Wall Street Journal claiming that the IARC study showed a possibly “trivial or nonexistent” risk of lung cancer from ETS, demonstrating that the health risks of ETS are overstated.142
9. Misrepresenting Scientific Studies to the Media and Regulators
The results of the IARC ETS study, released in 1998, showed that non-smoking spouses of smokers have an estimated 16% increased risk of developing lung cancer and that non-smokers exposed to ETS in the workplace have an estimated 17% increased risk of developing lung cancer.143 IARC’s reported results were consistent with the results of other ETS studies, showing an increased risk of lung cancer for nonsmokers exposed to ETS by a spouse or in the workplace.144 However, there were not enough subjects in the study for the increased risk to reach “statistical significance,” using common statistical methods (i.e., at the 95% confidence level).145
Shortly after the results of the IARC ETS study were released, BAT issued a press release stating: “New scientific research from the World Health Organization has shown the risk of lung cancer from environmental tobacco smoke to be either non-existent or too small to be measured at a meaningful level.”146 Thus, BAT claimed that the lack of statistical significance was equivalent to a finding that there was no relationship between ETS and lung cancer. These claims were picked up first by the Sunday Telegraph and then by other news outlets.
Despite subsequent clarifying statements from IARC and WHO about the study results, the misrepresentation of the study results in the BAT news release was repeated in media accounts around the world. Tobacco companies may also have distorted the IARC study results when addressing regulatory authorities.
10. Staging Media Events or Other Diversions to Discredit or Distract Attention from WHO Tobacco Control Activities
Tobacco companies planned a series of distractions from the 8th World Conference on Tobacco OR Health. These plans, at least some of which were carried out, included a media campaign just before the 8th WCToH, emphasizing the need for childhood immunizations; a major soccer game to distract attention from Jimmy Carter’s arrival; training journalists to disrupt a press conference held by the conference organizers; and embarrassing US Senator Ted Kennedy by planting journalists to ask questions about drinking and sexual harassment allegations.
One unattributed BAT document with the handwritten title “Dietrich/WHO” on the title page also planned an event, called the “Global Children’s Health Conference,” to “distract the media from extensive coverage of the May 31, 1990 International Anti- Smoking Day and the 1990 theme of Smoking and Children.”147 According to the document, through the Institute for IIHD, run by Paul Dietrich (see Chapter VI), BAT would hold a conference for business and government leaders and launch a longer- term strategy to increase private funding for children’s health issue. In describing the program strategy, the BAT document states:
“ The event will be staged to pre-empt monitored WHO meetings and conferences“,150 had confidential WHO contacts,151 and obtained confidential documents and information.152 Examples of clandestine surveillance activities are described in several of the case studies.
“The conference can facilitate the development of a long-term initiative to counteract the WHO’s anti- smoking campaign
“At no time during the event will the issue of smoking be addressed…
“…Design the Conference to address primary health needs of children underscoring the ‘real crisis’. Develop an oblique critique of WHO’s anti- smoking campaign which identifies it as trivial when the global infants’ and children’s crisis is evaluated.
“Introduce alternative solutions which, in the long-term, could successfully undermine the WHO’s overall mandate.”148
It appears that BAT did not carry through with this conference.
11. Conducting Systematic Surveillance of WHO Activities
Tobacco companies have carried out intensive monitoring of WHO and its Regional Offices to gather intelligence about its tobacco control programs.149
Some of the industry’s intelligence-gathering has been conducted openly, through attendance at open meetings and conferences and through open contacts with WHO and other UN officials.
There is also evidence, however, that tobacco companies have secretly monitored conferences,150 had confidential WHO contacts,151 and obtained confidential documents and information.152
Examples of clandestine surveillance activities are described in several of the case studies.
This ends the excerpt. You can read and download the full 250 page UN Report in PDF format here:
If you are inclined to look at references, here they are – just for this section. The entire report contains thousands of similarly damning references that put the moral degradation and greed of this industry on full display. And they really don’t care, because they have convinced themselves that they are untouchable. They would do well to remember – Al Capone was brought down by a simple little tax violation and not by any of his vast criminal conspiracies and crimes.
I think that the industry’s attempt to engineer a shift from smoking to vaporizing is going to reveal the tobacco industry’s equivalent of a simple little tax evasion crime that will be enough, when all the evidence is brought to bear, for the initiation of a crimes against humanity trial in the World Court that will ultimately result in worldwide government and civil seizure of tobacco industry assets.
Notes & References
WHOIIOCUIUICC: Strategies and Tactics. January 31, 1989. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501045143–5147 at 5143. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 32846.
Appendix I, INFOTAB January 1989 Discussion Paper. January 30, 1989. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501045258–5268 at 5262. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33561.
World Watch: Protecting our Global ‘Next Generation’-A Proposed Conference on Children’s Health Issues. October 1989. 300516227–6285 at 6235. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33691.
WHOIIOCUIUICC: Strategies and Tactics. January 31, 1989. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501045143–5147 at 5143. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 32846.
Hartogh JM. To all members of the ICOSI task force 4th world conference on smoking and health. [Memo by E. Brueckner.] June 26, 1979. British American Tobacco Company. 100433043–3047 at 3046. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33162.
WHOIIOCUIUICC: Strategies and Tactics. January 31, 1989. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501045143–5147 at 5146. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 32846.
Appendix I, INFOTAB January 1989 Discussion Paper. January 30, 1989. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501045258–5268. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33561.
WHOIIOCUIUICC: Strategies and Tactics. January 31, 1989. Philip Morris Companies Inc. .2501045143–5147 at 5146. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 32846.
PMI Corporate Affairs Action Plan 1990. November 2, 1989est. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2500019979–9999 at 9980–9982. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33558.
Sullivan J. IARC Study. September 2, 1993. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501117793– 7797 at 7795. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33603
Egawa E. April 25, 1986. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2021654119–4123. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 66.
Bloxidge JA. International Tobacco Growers’ Association (ITGA). October 11, 1988. British American Tobacco Company. 502555415–5417 at 5417. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33284.
Boyse S. 8th World Conference on Tobacco and Health. August 28, 1991. British American Tobacco Company. 202019292–9293 at 9292. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33262.
Bible G. Corporate Affairs Conference I Action Plan. December 13, 1986. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2021596422–6432 at 6429. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 32834.
Appendix I, INFOTAB January 1989 Discussion Paper. January 30, 1989. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501045258–5268. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33561.
Interview with Alan Lopez, Coordinator, Epidemiology and Burden of Disease, World Health Organization, May 4, 2000.
Oldman M. [Letter to G Pedlow]. March 13, 1991. British American Tobacco Company. 502555357–5363 at 5363. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33278.
Agro-Tobacco Services-Programme Review No1. 1992. British American Tobacco Company. 502552606–2611 at 2609. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33290.
Interview with Alan Lopez, May 4, 2000.
Lee PN. Dr. Helmut Schievelbein. August 9, 1979. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501159889–9891 at 9889. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33717.
Minutes of the Meeting of the Working Group of the E.E.C. Tobacco Manufacturers’ Associations, Held in Luxemburg on 4th and 5th October 1979. November 11, 1979. Philip
Morris Companies Inc. 2501015083–5096 at 5088. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33716.
Belcher P. Scientific Committee on Tobacco and Health (SCTH). February 9, 1994. Rothmans International. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2024188905–8907 at 8905. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33715.
Independent Scientific Review of the Toxic Substances Board Report, May 1989, Summary, Commissioned by the Tobacco Institute of New Zealand. 1989est. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2504203558–3559. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33535.
Collett C. Memo to Ted Sterling re: International Symposium on Environmental Tobacco Smoke, November 3-4, 1989.
November 1989est. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2062856942. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33536.
Rothman’s International Tobacco ETS Workshop. May 1992est. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501237099. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33532.
25 . Pen Pictures of Guest Speakers. May 1992est. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501237101– 7103 at 7101. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33531.
S&H. Re: Dr. Furst-Review of Non-Smoker Problem CTR Special Pro}ect. 1976est. Lorillard Tobacco Company. 03747419. TDO Supersite at www.tobaccodocuments.org. UQ 33714.
From the record before Congress, the Case for Defeat of S. 772. 1983est. Tobacco Institute. TIMN 0353310–3320 at 3312. TDO Supersite at www.tobaccodocuments.org/. UQ 33729.
Purvis A, Johnson J. Privileged and confidential attorneyIclient connumications. Trial Report, SummaryITestimonyIPro}ection. April 21, 1988. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2025880540– 0543. Bliley Documents at www.tobaccodocuments.org. UQ 33730.
Tobacco Institute Newsletter. March 12, 1982. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 515841024. Bliley Documents at www.tobaccodocuments.org. UQ 98.
Hoel D. Confidential-For counsel only. July 10, 1979. Philip Morris Companies Inc.
Tobacco Institute Newsletter. March 12, 1982. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 515841024. Bliley Documents at www.tobaccodocuments.org. UQ 98.
Lyberopoulos H. ARISE 1994-95 Activities and Funding. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2024208096–8099. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33779.
Information on Associates for Research in Substance En}oyment Meeting in Venice. 1991est. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company. 508300651–0667 at 0652. http://www.rjrtdocs UQ 33749.
Wilhelmus J. WHO. April 18, 1995. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2063625254. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33541.
Luik J, Snel J, Warburton D. ARISE (Associates for Research into the Science of En}oyment): A Summary of the Workshop Held in April 1995. April 1995est. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company. 511818234–8241. www.rjrtdocs.com. UQ 33731.
The World Health Organization. December 1985est. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2023267436. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 46.
36 . Reif H. Continuation of the Vettorazzi Pro}ect. March 25, 1992. Philip Morris Companies Inc. PM 2025594741–4743 at 4742. http://www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33466.
Consultant to ICOSI on International Organisations. August 1980est. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2025049734. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 37.
Developing Countries Group (DCG). Progress report covering events since the ICOSI board of directors meeting October 5I8th, 1980. February 1981est. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2025049364–9374 at 9365. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 40.
Hauser. [Letter to AG Leeks]. April 20, 1983. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2023273908– 3909. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 42.
Secretariat Interim Report. December 28,1984. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2023272512– 2617 at 2514. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 43.
CASIN. January 11, 1991. British American Tobacco Company. 300557237–7259 at 7241. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33350.
CASIN. January 11, 1991. British American Tobacco Company. 300557237–7259 at 7240. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33350.
CASIN. January 11, 1991. British American Tobacco Company. 300557237–7259 at 7256. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33350.
Interviews with Neil Collishaw, Leanne Riley, and Barbara Zolty, all former employees of the WHO’s Tobacco or Health Program, Feb. 4, 2000.
Boca Raton Action Plan: WHOIIOCUIUICC: Strategies and Tactics. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501045143–5147 at 5146. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 32846.
E–mail communication from Neil Collishaw. March 29, 2000.
Interviews with Neil Collishaw, Barbara Zolty, and Leanne Riley, February 4, 2000.
E–mail communication from Barbara Zolty, March 2, 2000.
Sullivan J. IARC Study. September 2, 1993. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501117793– 7797 at 7795. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33603.
Von Maerestetten C. IARC. July 26, 1993. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2025493295. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33776.
IARC Study. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501347168–7173 at 7172. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33595.
Pages R. Update 2: IARC study of ETS and lung cancer. August 2, 1993. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 20232999819. http://www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33733.
Memo on vaccines for world health organization. October 25, 1971. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2012581044. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 4.
Boca Raton Action Plan: WHOIIOCUIUICC: Strategies and Tactics. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501045143–5147 at 5146. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 32846.
Flavor and Extract Manufacturers Association. Invoice. August 17, 1995. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2050761274. http://www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33546.
Schrankel K. Final Report to Contributors of Anethole Research Fund. August 25, 1998. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2063597040. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33548.
Minutes of Anethole Task Force. May 2, 1996. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2063616600. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33547.
Minutes of Anethole Task Force. May 2, 1996. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2063616600. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33547.
Schrankel. Final Report to Contributors of Anethole Research Fund. August 25, 1998. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2063597040. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33548
Hartogh JM. To all members of the ICOSI task force 4th world conference on smoking and health. [Memo by E. Brueckner.] June 26, 1979. British American Tobacco Company.
Oldman M. [Letter to G Pedlow]. March 13, 1991. British American Tobacco Company. 502555357–5363 at 5358. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33278.
Developing Countries Ad Hoc Group (DCG). Progress Report Covering Events Since the ICOSI Board of Directors Meeting on 19th February, 1980. August 1980est.
Philip Morris1987. British American Tobacco Company. 301760973–0979 at 0979. Guildford Document
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Appendix I, INFOTAB January 1989, Discussion Paper. January 30, 1989. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501045258–5268 at 5262. Minnesota Document Depository. UQ 33561.
Pro}ect Report Covering Pro}ects and Action Plans Since the Board of Directors Meeting on March 30, 1981. 1981est. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2025048077–8088 at 8077. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 41.
Pro}ect Report Covering Pro}ects and Action Plans Since the Board of Directors Meeting on March 30, 1981. 1981est. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2025048077–8088 at 8082. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 41.
Verkerk H. Fifth World Conference on Smoking and Health-Winnepeg. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501021564–1586 at 1577. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 32888.
Secretariat Interim Report. December 28, 1984. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2023272512– 2617 at 2594. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 43.
Marcotullio. INFOTAB Board of Director’s (BOD) Meeting-March 30, 1981. April 6, 1981. 502741855. Bliley Documents at www.tobaccodocuments.org. UQ 60.
Witt S. International Committee on Smoking Issues Lausanne-November 10-12, 1977.
Schlosser A, Mine K (Chadbourne, Parke). Representative Compilation of Literature Describing the Benefits of Tobacco. April 29, 1986. Brown & Williamson Company. 681870460–0654 at 0602. Bliley Documents at
International Organizations Monitoring Service. Industry Sectors and International Organizations-Tobacco Update and Outlook on World Health Organization Activities Affecting MNCs. March 5, 1986. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2024272808- 2814 at 2812. Bliley Documents at www.tobaccodocuments.org. UQ 33777.
Oldman M. [Letter to D. Bacon, enclosing “Agro-Tobacco Services (ATS), Proposal for a Consultancy Agreement”]. January 7, 1992. British American Tobacco Company. 502552644–2654 at 2650. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33302.
Oldman M. [Letter to D. Bacon, enclosing “Agro-Tobacco Services (ATS), Proposal for a Consultancy Agreement”]. January 7, 1992. British American Tobacco Company. 502552644–2654 at 2647. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33302.
Oldman M. [Letter to G. Pedlow]. March 13, 1991. British American Tobacco Company. 502555357–5363 at 5361. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33278.
Oldman M. [Letter to G. Pedlow]. March 13, 1991. British American Tobacco Company. 502555357–5363 at 5358. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33278.
Oldman M. [Letter to G. Pedlow]. March 13, 1991. British American Tobacco Company. 502555357–5363 at 5361. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33278.
Oldman M. [Letter to D Bacon enclosing Agro- tobacco Activity Report for January 1993]. February 10, 1993. British American Tobacco Company. 502552508–2513 at 2512–2513. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33296.
Oldman M. Paper for ITGA General Meeting, 1994. 1994est. British American Tobacco
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Bacon D. Development Aid, Progress. November 28, 1991. British American Tobacco Company. 202049931–9932 at 9931. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33256.
Bacon D. Development Aid, Progress. November 28, 1991. British American Tobacco Company. 202049931–9932 at 9932. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33256.
Bible G. Corporate Affairs Conference I Action Plan. December 13, 1988. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2021596422–6432 at 6429. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 32834.
Boca Raton Action Plan: Status Report for the Period Ending January 31, 1989. January 31, 1989. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2500103969–4056 at 3989. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 32863.
Boyse S. [Letter to Peter Hazel, David Bacon, and JJ Mostyn]. August 8, 1991. British American Tobacco Company. 304004032. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33184
Dietrich P. WHO spends money on what? The Wall Street Journal, May 9, 1989. UQ 33662.
Oldman M. [Letter to D. Bacon enclosing Activity Report, September/October 1993]. November 1, 1993. British American Tobacco Company. 502555329–5331 at 5331. UQ 33276.
Boca Raton Action Plan: Status Report for the Period Ending May 31, 1989. May 31, 1989. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2021592752– 2764 at 2752. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 32859.
Boca Raton Action Plan: Status Report Ending July 31, 1989. July 31, 1989. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2023547120–7135 at 7121. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 32860.
Boca Raton Action Plan Summary Report December 3, 1988-October 30, 1989. October 30, 1989. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2503005015–5050. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 32862.
Oldman M. [Letter to D. Bacon enclosing Activity Report, September/October 1993]. November 1, 1993. British American Tobacco Company. 502555329–5331 at 5331. UQ 33276
Ntaba H. Letter to the Editor, International Health and Development, Vol. 1, No. 2, Summer, p. 31. UQ 33689.
Boca Raton Action Plan: Status Report for the Period Ending September 30, 1989. September 30, 1989. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501204997–5021 at 4998. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 32861.
Boyse S. [Letter to Paul Dietrich]. August 7, 1991. British American Tobacco Company. 300516113. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33571.
Rupp J. Statement, Philip Morris International (Latin America). November 30, 1992. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2023591405. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 32903.
Bacon D. Who Benefits from WHO? November 24, 1993. British American Tobacco Company.
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Agenda: “Primer Encuentro de Periodistas Y la Industria Del Tabaco.” June 1991est. British American Tobacco Company. 300565679– 5681. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33675.
BAT Smoking Issues Briefing, Taiwan. September 6–8, 1992. British American
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British American Tobacco Company. 300565668–5671. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33678.
Oldman M. [Letter to G. Pedlow]. March 13, 1991. British American Tobacco Company. 502555357–5363 at 5359. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33278.
Bloxidge JA. International Tobacco Growers’ Association (ITGA). October 11, 1988. British American Tobacco Company. 502555415– 5417. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33284.
Oldman M. [Letter to G. Pedlow]. March 13, 1991. British American Tobacco Company. 502555357–5363 at 5360. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33278.
Oldman M. Agro-Tobacco Services (ATS), Proposed Plan. November 1991. British American Tobacco Company. 502552655–2667 at 2659. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33303.
INFOTAB International Workshop, Brussels, October 13-16, 1986. October 16, 1986. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501446636–7080 at 6723–6724. www.pmdocs.com UQ 33566.
Boca Raton Action Plan: Appendix A, WHOIIOCUIUICC: Strategies and Tactics. January 31, 1989. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501045143–5147.www.pmdocs.com UQ 32846.
Wells JK. INFOTAB Advisory Council Meeting July 14 and 15, 1982. July 21, 1982. Brown &Williamson Company. 680002301–2307.
Bible G. Corporate Affairs Conference I Action Plan. December 13, 1988. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2021596422–6432 at 6429. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 32834.
Egawa E. April 25, 1986. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2021654119–4123 at 4121. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 66.
Egawa E. April 25, 1986. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2021654119–4123 at 4121. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 66.
INFOTAB International Workshop, Brussels, October 13-16, 1986. October 16, 1986. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501446636–7080 at 6677. www.pmdocs.com UQ 33566.
Egawa E. April 25, 1986. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2021654119–4123 at 4120. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 66.
Whitley C. Statement of Charles O. Whitley on behalf of the Tobacco Institute before the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment, Committee on Energy and Commerce, US House of Representatives [Draft]. July 9, 1990. Tobacco Institute TIMN 0032095–2141 at 2118. Bliley Documents. www.tobaccodocuments.org. UQ 32912.
Zhang M. [Attaching Press article in the China Daily on the CIAR’s GEP workshop in Guangzhou.] September 9, 1997. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2063608546–8547. http://www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33752.
Whitley C. Statement of Charles O. Whitley on behalf of the Tobacco Institute before the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment, Committee on Energy and Commerce, US House of Representatives [Draft]. July 9, 1990. Tobacco Institute TIMN 0032095–0032141 at 2118. Bliley Documents. www.tobaccodocuments.org. UQ 32912.
Press release by the organizers of the expert discussion of the “Physician’s View of Passive Smoking”: Health Danger through Passive Smoking Not Proven. April 1984. Philip Morris Companies. 1002965608–6509. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33770.
Masironi R. [Letter to W. Kloepfer]. December 2, 1986. Philip Morris Companies Inc.
Greenberg D. IARC. September 15, 1993. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2021184116–4121 at 4119. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33590.
Walk, R.A. IARC Multi-Center Case Control Study of ETS and Lung Cancer, Your memo dated 21 May 93. July 13, 1993. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2025493287. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33616.
IARC Study. 1994est. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501347168–7173 at 7169. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33595.
Pages R. IARC Study of ETS and Lung Cancer. May 21, 1993. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2500015757. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33617.
Walk, R.A. IARC Multi-Center Case Control Study of ETS and Lung Cancer: Update of information. July 30, 1993. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2029041838–1839. http://www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33618.
Interview with Paolo Boffetta, April 17, 2000.
Greenberg D. IARC. September 15, 1993. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2021184116–4121 at 4119. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33590.
IARC Study. 1994est. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501347168–7173 at 7169. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33595.
Greenberg D. IARC. September 15, 1993. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2021184116–4121 at 4118. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33590.
Boyse S. [Letter to Ron Tully.] April 18, 1990. British American Tobacco Company. 400099555. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33507.
Boyse S. [Letter to PN Lee.] December 19, 1989. British American Tobacco Company. 400099679. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33509.
Lee P. May 8, 1990. British American Tobacco Company. 502587275–7284 at 7275. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33236.
Winokur M. [FAX to H. Reif attaching “CIAR and IARC, Next Steps and Options.”] December 19, 1994. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2028381587–1588 at 1588. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33746.
Interview with Paulo Boffetta, April 17, 2000.
Matthews R, MacDonald V. Passive smokers inhale six cigarettes a year. Sunday Telegraph. August 16, 1998.
Lyberopoulos, H. Presentation on IARC [enclosing overheads]. April 19, 1994. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501355931–5944 at 5942. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33604.
Hockaday T, Cohen N. Thoughts on TASSC Europe. March 25, 1994. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2025492898–2905 at 2899. http://www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33758.
Lindheim J. Presentation on Scientist Pro}ect. May 5, 1994. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2025493201–3207 at 3205–3206. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33708.
Ong E, Glantz S. Tobacco industry efforts subverting International Agency for Research on Cancer’s second–hand smoke study. The Lancet. 2000; 355: 1253–59.
Mooney L. Smoking out bad science. Wall Street J. March 19, 1998; A18.
Boffetta P, Agudo A, Ahrens W, et al. Multicenter case–control study of exposure to environmental tobacco smoke and lung cancer in Europe. J Natl Cancer Inst 1998; 90: 1440– 50.
Hirayama T. Non–smoking wives of heavy smokers have a higher risk of lung cancer: A study from Japan. BMJ 1981; 282:183–85.
Repace JL, Lowery AH. A quantitative estimate of nonsmokers’ lung cancer risk from passive smoking. Environment Int. 1985;11:3–22.
US Environmental Protection Agency. Health effects of passive smoking: Assessment of lung cancer in adults and respiratory disorders in children. Office of Research and Development, Office of Health and Environmental Assessment. EPA/600/6–90/006F, 1992b.
Boffetta P, Agudo A, Ahrens W, et al. Multicenter case–control study of exposure to environmental tobacco smoke and lung cancer in Europe. J Natl Cancer Inst 1998; 90: 1440–50.
British American Tobacco. [ News release]. March 5, 1998. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2063594010–4240 at 4018. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33750.
World Watch: Protecting our Global ‘Next Generation’-A Proposed Conference on Children’s Health Issues. October 1989. 300516227–6285 at 6235. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33691.
World Watch: Protecting our Global ‘Next Generation’-A Proposed Conference on Children’s Health Issues. October 1989. British American Tobacco Company. 300516227–6285 at 6236. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33691.
INFOTAB . Item 2 Report From The Secretary General . January 1, 1982est. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2021594826–4836. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 32.
Background to the Structure and Operations of the Activist Movement. November 15, 1994.
Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501110753– 0775. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 68.
Seymour M. 6 September 1996 IARC European Response Plan Workshop. August 8, 1996.
Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2063604476– 4498. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 71.
Hauser N. Trip Report-RomeIFAO November 26-29, 1984. November 26, 1984. Philip Morris
Hartogh J. Report by Task Force 5th World Conference on Smoking and Health, Winnipeg, Canada, July 1983. February 26, 1981. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2025049376–9377. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33514.
The World Health Organization (WHO): Its Work Related to the Activities of the International Tobacco Industry. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501442830–2897 at 2501442889–2897. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 5.
Lojacono G. Research Group Informal Meeting On: Health Effects of ETS in Europe-Paris-P. Broussell Hospital (Ville}uif 13I14 March, 1991). March 1991est. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501356073–6076. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33534.
JMH–possibly Hartogh J. Action Plan proposed by ICOSI Task Force 4th World Conference on Smoking & Health. January 29, 1979. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501015212–5215. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33549.
The World Health Organization (WHO): Its Work Related to the Activities of the International Tobacco Industry. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501442830–2897 at 2834. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 5.
Tully R. 8th WCTH. January 29, 1992. British American Tobacco Company. 300504241– 4252. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33334.
The World Health Organization (WHO): Its Work Related to the Activities of the International Tobacco Industry. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501442830–2897 at 2889– 2890. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 5.
Informal Meeting of the IARC Research Group on ETS and Human Cancer. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501349504–9507. http://www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33636.
47th WHO World Assembly: Informal meeting of some members of the IARC study group “ETS and the Lung Cancer”. Geneva May 3-6, 1994. Philip Morris Companies Inc. May 5, 1994.
Wilhelmus J. WHO. April 18, 1995. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2063625254. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33541.
CECCM. IARC Study. April 4, 1995. British American Tobacco Company. 500804531– 4537. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33774.
Cerioli A. Report on my attendance to the Conference “Conoscenze Scientifiche, Seperi Popolari e Socita Umana alle Soglie del Duemile. Attualite del Pensiero di A. Maccacaro.” January 27, 1997. Philip Morris
Menchaca. January 25, 1990. British American Tobacco Company. 502587287. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33237.
Lojacono G. Research Group Informal Meeting On: Health Effects of ETS in Europe-Paris-P. Broussell Hospital (Ville}uif 13I14 March, 1991). March 14, 1991est. Philip Morris
Pages R. [Forwarding note from H. Reif: IARC Study]. July 19, 1993. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2025470098. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 32800.
Dietrich P. [Letter to Sharon Boyse, Enclosing Memo of Visit to Thailand and Philippines]. January 29, 1992. British American Tobacco Company. 300516024–37. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33682.
WHOIIOCUIUICC: Strategies and Tactics. January 31, 1989. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501045143–5147 at 5143. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 32846.
Appendix I, INFOTAB January 1989 Discussion Paper. January 30, 1989. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501045258–5268 at 5262. pmdocs.com. UQ 33561.
World Watch: Protecting our Global ‘Next Generation’-A Proposed Conference on Children’s Health Issues. October 1989. 300516227–6285 at 6235. Guildford Document Depository. UQ
WHOIIOCUIUICC: Strategies and Tactics. January 31, 1989. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501045143–5147 at 5143. pmdocs.com. UQ 32846.
Hartogh JM. To all members of the ICOSI task force 4th world conference on smoking and health. [Memo by E. Brueckner.] June 26, 1979. British American Tobacco Company. 100433043–3047 at 3046. Guildford Document Depository. UQ
WHOIIOCUIUICC: Strategies and Tactics. January 31, 1989. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501045143–5147 at 5146. pmdocs.com. UQ 32846.
Appendix I, INFOTAB January 1989 Discussion Paper. January 30, 1989. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501045258–5268. pmdocs.com. UQ 33561.
PMI Corporate Affairs Action Plan 1990. November 2, 1989est. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2500019979–9999 at 9980–9982. pmdocs.com. UQ 33558.
Sullivan J. IARC Study. September 2, 1993. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501117793– 7797 at 7795. pmdocs.com. UQ 33603
Egawa E. April 25, 1986. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2021654119–4123. pmdocs.com. UQ 66.
Bloxidge JA. International Tobacco Growers’ Association (ITGA). October 11, 1988. British American Tobacco Company. 502555415–5417 at 5417. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33284.
Boyse S. 8th World Conference on Tobacco and Health. August 28, 1991. British American Tobacco Company. 202019292–9293 at 9292. Guildford Document Depository. UQ
Bible G. Corporate Affairs Conference I Action Plan. December 13, 1986. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2021596422–6432 at 6429. pmdocs.com. UQ 32834.
Appendix I, INFOTAB January 1989 Discussion Paper. January 30, 1989. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501045258–5268. pmdocs.com. UQ 33561.
Interview with Alan Lopez, Coordinator, Epidemiology and Burden of Disease, World Health Organization, May 4,
Oldman M. [Letter to G Pedlow]. March 13, 1991. British American Tobacco Company. 502555357–5363 at 5363. Guildford Document Depository. UQ
Agro-Tobacco Services-Programme Review No1. British American Tobacco Company. 502552606–2611 at 2609. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33290.
Interview with Alan Lopez, May 4,
Lee PN. Helmut Schievelbein. August 9, 1979. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501159889–9891 at 9889. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33717.
Minutes of the Meeting of the Working Group of the E.E.C. Tobacco Manufacturers’ Associations, Held in Luxemburg on 4th and 5th October 1979. November 11, 1979. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501015083–5096 at 5088. pmdocs.com. UQ 33716.
Belcher P. Scientific Committee on Tobacco and Health (SCTH). February 9, 1994. Rothmans International. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2024188905–8907 at 8905. pmdocs.com. UQ 33715.
Independent Scientific Review of the Toxic Substances Board Report, May 1989, Summary, Commissioned by the Tobacco Institute of New Zealand. 1989est. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2504203558–3559. pmdocs.com. UQ 33535.
Collett C. Memo to Ted Sterling re: International Symposium on Environmental Tobacco Smoke, November 3-4, 1989.
November 1989est. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2062856942. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33536.
Rothman’s International Tobacco ETS Workshop. May 1992est. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501237099. pmdocs.com. UQ 33532.
25 . Pen Pictures of Guest Speakers. May 1992est. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501237101– 7103 at 7101. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33531.
S&H. Re: Dr. Furst-Review of Non-Smoker Problem CTR Special Pro}ect. 1976est. Lorillard Tobacco Company. 03747419. TDO Supersite at tobaccodocuments.org. UQ 33714.
From the record before Congress, the Case for Defeat of S. 772. 1983est. Tobacco Institute. TIMN 0353310–3320 at 3312. TDO Supersite at tobaccodocuments.org/. UQ 33729.
Purvis A, Johnson J. Privileged and confidential attorneyIclient connumications. Trial Report, SummaryITestimonyIPro}ection. April 21, 1988. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2025880540– 0543. Bliley Documents at tobaccodocuments.org. UQ 33730.
Tobacco Institute Newsletter. March 12, 1982. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 515841024. Bliley Documents at tobaccodocuments.org. UQ 98.
Hoel D. Confidential-For counsel only. July 10, 1979. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 6267450002. Bliley Documents at www.tobaccodocuments.org. UQ 99.
Tobacco Institute Newsletter. March 12, 1982. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 515841024. Bliley Documents at tobaccodocuments.org. UQ 98.
Lyberopoulos H. ARISE 1994-95 Activities and Funding. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2024208096–8099. pmdocs.com. UQ 33779.
Information on Associates for Research in Substance En}oyment Meeting in Venice. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company. 508300651–0667 at 0652. http://www.rjrtdocs UQ 33749.
Wilhelmus J. WHO. April 18, 1995. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2063625254. pmdocs.com. UQ 33541.
Luik J, Snel J, Warburton D. ARISE (Associates for Research into the Science of En}oyment): A Summary of the Workshop Held in April 1995. April 1995est. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company. 511818234–8241. rjrtdocs.com. UQ 33731.
The World Health Organization. December 1985est. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2023267436. pmdocs.com. UQ 46.
36 . Reif H. Continuation of the Vettorazzi Pro}ect. March 25, 1992. Philip Morris Companies Inc. PM 2025594741–4743 at 4742. http://www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33466.
Consultant to ICOSI on International Organisations. August 1980est. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2025049734. pmdocs.com. UQ 37.
Developing Countries Group (DCG). Progress report covering events since the ICOSI board of directors meeting October 5I8th, 1980. February 1981est. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2025049364–9374 at 9365. pmdocs.com. UQ 40.
Hauser. [Letter to AG Leeks]. April 20, 1983. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2023273908– 3909. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 42.
Secretariat Interim Report. December 28,1984. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2023272512– 2617 at 2514. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 43.
January 11, 1991. British American Tobacco Company. 300557237–7259 at 7241. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33350.
January 11, 1991. British American Tobacco Company. 300557237–7259 at 7240. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33350.
January 11, 1991. British American Tobacco Company. 300557237–7259 at 7256. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33350.
Interviews with Neil Collishaw, Leanne Riley, and Barbara Zolty, all former employees of the WHO’s Tobacco or Health Program, Feb. 4, 2000.
Boca Raton Action Plan: WHOIIOCUIUICC: Strategies and Tactics. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501045143–5147 at 5146. pmdocs.com. UQ 32846.
E–mail communication from Neil Collishaw. March 29,
Interviews with Neil Collishaw, Barbara Zolty, and Leanne Riley, February 4,
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Sullivan J. IARC Study. September 2, 1993. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501117793– 7797 at 7795. pmdocs.com. UQ 33603.
Von Maerestetten C. IARC. July 26, 1993. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2025493295. pmdocs.com. UQ 33776.
IARC Study. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501347168–7173 at 7172. pmdocs.com. UQ 33595.
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Minutes of Anethole Task Force. May 2, 1996. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2063616600. pmdocs.com. UQ 33547.
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Corti A. Director of Information Services, INFOTAB. Latin American Meetings-
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Pro}ect Report Covering Pro}ects and Action Plans Since the Board of Directors Meeting on March 30, 1981. 1981est. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2025048077–8088 at 8077. pmdocs.com. UQ 41.
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Secretariat Interim Report. December 28, 1984. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2023272512– 2617 at 2594. pmdocs.com. UQ 43.
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Witt S. International Committee on Smoking Issues Lausanne-November 10-12, 1977.
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Opukah S. ECOSOCIFAO Positions on Tobacco. August 18, 1994. British American
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Brady B. March 3, 1992. British American
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Bible G. Corporate Affairs Conference I Action Plan. December 13, 1988. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2021596422–6432 at 6429. pmdocs.com. UQ 32834.
Boca Raton Action Plan: Status Report for the Period Ending January 31, 1989. January 31, 1989. Philip Morris Companies Inc.2500103969–4056 at 3989. www.pmdocs.com.
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Dietrich P. WHO spends money on what? The Wall Street Journal, May 9, 1989. UQ
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Boca Raton Action Plan: Status Report for the Period Ending May 31, 1989. May 31, 1989. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2021592752– 2764 at 2752. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 32859.
Boca Raton Action Plan: Status Report Ending July 31, 1989. July 31, 1989. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2023547120–7135 at 7121. pmdocs.com. UQ 32860.
Boca Raton Action Plan Summary Report December 3, 1988-October 30, 1989. October 30, 1989. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2503005015–5050. pmdocs.com. UQ 32862.
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Ntaba H. Letter to the Editor, International Health and Development, Vol. 1, No. 2, Summer, p. 31. UQ
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Agenda: “Primer Encuentro de Periodistas Y la Industria Del Tabaco.” June 1991est. British American Tobacco Company. 300565679– 5681. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33675.
BAT Smoking Issues Briefing, Taiwan. September 6–8, 1992. British American
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Bloxidge JA. International Tobacco Growers’ Association (ITGA). October 11, 1988. British American Tobacco Company. 502555415– 5417. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33284.
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Oldman M. Agro-Tobacco Services (ATS), Proposed Plan. November 1991. British American Tobacco Company. 502552655–2667 at 2659. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33303.
INFOTAB International Workshop, Brussels, October 13-16, 1986. October 16, 1986. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501446636–7080 at 6723–6724. pmdocs.com UQ 33566.
Boca Raton Action Plan: Appendix A, WHOIIOCUIUICC: Strategies and Tactics. January 31, 1989. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501045143–5147.pmdocs.com UQ 32846.
Wells JK. INFOTAB Advisory Council Meeting July 14 and 15, 1982. July 21, 1982. Brown &Williamson Company. 680002301–2307.
Bible G. Corporate Affairs Conference I Action Plan. December 13, 1988. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2021596422–6432 at 6429. pmdocs.com. UQ 32834.
Egawa E. April 25, 1986. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2021654119–4123 at 4121. pmdocs.com. UQ 66.
Egawa E. April 25, 1986. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2021654119–4123 at 4121. pmdocs.com. UQ 66.
INFOTAB International Workshop, Brussels, October 13-16, 1986. October 16, 1986. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501446636–7080 at 6677. pmdocs.com UQ 33566.
Egawa E. April 25, 1986. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2021654119–4123 at 4120. pmdocs.com. UQ 66.
Whitley C. Statement of Charles O. Whitley on behalf of the Tobacco Institute before the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment, Committee on Energy and Commerce, US House of Representatives [Draft]. July 9, 1990. Tobacco Institute TIMN 0032095–2141 at 2118. Bliley Documents. tobaccodocuments.org. UQ 32912.
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Whitley C. Statement of Charles O. Whitley on behalf of the Tobacco Institute before the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment, Committee on Energy and Commerce, US House of Representatives [Draft]. July 9, 1990. Tobacco Institute TIMN 0032095–0032141 at 2118. Bliley Documents. tobaccodocuments.org. UQ 32912.
Press release by the organizers of the expert discussion of the “Physician’s View of Passive Smoking”: Health Danger through Passive Smoking Not Proven. April 1984. Philip Morris Companies. 1002965608–6509. pmdocs.com. UQ 33770.
Masironi R. [Letter to W. Kloepfer]. December 2, 1986. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2025816621–6624. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33771.
Greenberg D. September 15, 1993. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2021184116–4121 at 4119. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33590.
Walk, R.A. IARC Multi-Center Case Control Study of ETS and Lung Cancer, Your memo dated 21 May 93. July 13, 1993. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2025493287. pmdocs.com. UQ 33616.
IARC Study. 1994est. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501347168–7173 at 7169. pmdocs.com. UQ 33595.
Pages R. IARC Study of ETS and Lung Cancer. May 21, 1993. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2500015757. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33617.
Walk, R.A. IARC Multi-Center Case Control Study of ETS and Lung Cancer: Update of information. July 30, 1993. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2029041838–1839. http://www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33618.
Interview with Paolo Boffetta, April 17, 2000.
Greenberg D. September 15, 1993. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2021184116–4121 at 4119. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33590.
IARC Study. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501347168–7173 at 7169. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33595.
Greenberg D. September 15, 1993. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2021184116–4121 at 4118. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33590.
Boyse S. [Letter to Ron Tully.] April 18, 1990. British American Tobacco Company. 400099555. Guildford Document Depository. UQ
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Lee P. May 8, 1990. British American Tobacco Company. 502587275–7284 at 7275. Guildford Document Depository. UQ
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Interview with Paulo Boffetta, April 17,
Matthews R, MacDonald V. Passive smokers inhale six cigarettes a year. Sunday Telegraph. August 16,
Lyberopoulos, H. Presentation on IARC [enclosing overheads]. April 19, 1994. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501355931–5944 at 5942. pmdocs.com. UQ 33604.
Hockaday T, Cohen N. Thoughts on TASSC Europe. March 25, 1994. Philip Morris
Lindheim J. Presentation on Scientist Pro}ect. May 5, 1994. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2025493201–3207 at 3205–3206. pmdocs.com. UQ 33708.
Ong E, Glantz S. Tobacco industry efforts subverting International Agency for Research on Cancer’s second–hand smoke study. The Lancet. 2000; 355: 1253–59.
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British American Tobacco. [ News release]. March 5, 1998. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2063594010–4240 at 4018. pmdocs.com. UQ 33750.
World Watch: Protecting our Global ‘Next Generation’-A Proposed Conference on Children’s Health Issues. October 1989. 300516227–6285 at 6235. Guildford Document Depository. UQ
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INFOTAB . Item 2 Report From The Secretary General . January 1, 1982est. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2021594826–4836. pmdocs.com. UQ 32.
Background to the Structure and Operations of the Activist Movement. November 15, 1994.
Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501110753– 0775. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 68.
Seymour M. 6 September 1996 IARC European Response Plan Workshop. August 8, 1996.
Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2063604476– 4498. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 71.
Hauser N. Trip Report-RomeIFAO November 26-29, 1984. November 26, 1984. Philip Morris
Hartogh J. Report by Task Force 5th World Conference on Smoking and Health, Winnipeg, Canada, July 1983. February 26, 1981. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2025049376–9377. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33514.
The World Health Organization (WHO): Its Work Related to the Activities of the International Tobacco Industry. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501442830–2897 at 2501442889–2897. pmdocs.com. UQ 5.
Lojacono G. Research Group Informal Meeting On: Health Effects of ETS in Europe-Paris-P. Broussell Hospital (Ville}uif 13I14 March, 1991). March 1991est. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501356073–6076. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33534.
JMH–possibly Hartogh J. Action Plan proposed by ICOSI Task Force 4th World Conference on Smoking & Health. January 29, 1979. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501015212–5215. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33549.
The World Health Organization (WHO): Its Work Related to the Activities of the International Tobacco Industry. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501442830–2897 at 2834. pmdocs.com. UQ 5.
Tully R. 8th WCTH. January 29, 1992. British American Tobacco Company. 300504241– 4252. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33334.
The World Health Organization (WHO): Its Work Related to the Activities of the International Tobacco Industry. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501442830–2897 at 2889– 2890. pmdocs.com. UQ 5.
Informal Meeting of the IARC Research Group on ETS and Human Cancer. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501349504–9507.
47th WHO World Assembly: Informal meeting of some members of the IARC study group “ETS and the Lung Cancer”. Geneva May 3-6, 1994. Philip Morris Companies Inc. May 5, 1994.
Wilhelmus J. WHO. April 18, 1995. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2063625254. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33541.
CECCM. IARC Study. April 4, 1995. British American Tobacco Company. 500804531– 4537. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33774.
Cerioli A. Report on my attendance to the Conference “Conoscenze Scientifiche, Seperi Popolari e Socita Umana alle Soglie del Duemile. Attualite del Pensiero di A. Maccacaro.” January 27, 1997. Philip Morris
Menchaca. January 25, 1990. British American Tobacco Company. 502587287. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33237.
Lojacono G. Research Group Informal Meeting On: Health Effects of ETS in Europe-Paris-P. Broussell Hospital (Ville}uif 13I14 March, 1991). March 14, 1991est. Philip Morris
Pages R. [Forwarding note from H. Reif: IARC Study]. July 19, 1993. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2025470098. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 32800.
Dietrich P. [Letter to Sharon Boyse, Enclosing Memo of Visit to Thailand and Philippines]. January 29, 1992. British American Tobacco Company. 300516024–37. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33682.
