The Tobacco companies aren’t deliberately mass murderers. They do maim and kill genocidal levels of people every single year, but that’s just as a byproduct of their business decisions. They don’t actually intend to have their customers sicken and die- it’s just so damned profitable to use stuff like DDT instead of labor to grow tobacco.
They do know that it’s the DDT and other xenobiotic chemicals they use in the fields, invisible to everyone, that are actually killing most of the people dying of “smoking-related disease.” They’ve spent huge amounts of money to keep that particular little piece of information top secret even though it’s been in plain view for fifty years. That has been quite a trick, but they have managed to pull it off pretty well so far. However, bad news is coming for the so-called “Tobacco” industry. All it’s going to take is one well-informed class-action lawsuit based solidly on injury by preventable pesticide contamination and this whole nasty conspiracy will finally come crashing down.
The thing is, these murderous companies don’t actually want to kill off their customers, although because they know that they do, they spend lots of money creating large numbers of what they call “replacement smokers” every year. They spend vast sums advertising heavily to kids worldwide, making cheap fruity sweet tobacco products readily available and now packaging straight nicotine in glycerin for vaping just to give kids a taste of the real thing. And those cute little replacement smokers just keep lining up.
Oh, and those small farmers in remote areas that work like slaves for the Tobacco companies and apply all those chemicals that should be labeled “severe hazard – inhalation”, but aren’t? There aren’t any labels on the 55 gallon drums of pesticide that the tobacco company agent drives up and hands to the farmers and says – “spray this tonight”. They aren’t complaining because if they do they won’t get their tobacco allotment next time and their families will starve, plain and simple. Yes everybody is always sick, and they have lost a few babies to disease, but they have to eat. So it’s really just business all up and down the line. Except that a lot of people seem to be dying at every step.
Even fifty years after global governments first banned DDT, and with every health agency in the world classifying it as an extreme hazard, the Tobacco companies are still forcing illiterate farmers in remote Tobacco-growing regions to drench the Tobacco crops with it. Why do this? Because if you use enough DDT all you need is one peasant with a tank on his back walking through the field killing all the bugs and worms with chemicals rather than twenty men, women and children working that same field, taking care of the tobacco using the old ways, and earning at least something of a wage, and not being drenched with DDT drift day and night.
Oh sure, the global tobacco industry could pay people to work the tobacco fields by hand and maybe even pay them a decent wage. Then tobacco products would be more expensive, which of course is exactly what American health authorities think is the only way to get people to cut down, quit or never start. You would think that everyone would get behind organic tobacco because it would be much more expensive, but that would mean more profits for the tobacco industry and not more taxes for the bureaucrats so of course that isn’t an appealing tobacco control strategy.
“We believe that making tobacco products more expensive reduces smoking, and it is a primary strategy for control and prevention. But, we don’t want to make tobacco more expensive by requiring that it be organic or at least meet reasonable pesticide residue standards, we want to leave outrageously dangerous pesticide contaminated tobacco alone and just make it more expensive using taxation. Our job isn’t to protect people – it’s to preach at them and take away their money so they can’t do bad things with it.”
Tobacco has always been an extremely profitable crop, but a very tough crop to farm. The problem is that bugs love tobacco more than just about any other plant. Tobacco is so high in both sugars and very rich protein that every kind of bug, animal and worm in nature loves to eat those incredibly valuable tobacco leaves. So, for centuries growing tobacco meant prodigious hand labor in the tobacco fields day and night (by guess who), along with great wealth (owned by guess who) that built the American society. But that tobacco wealth wasn’t an industry until agricultural chemicals came along, and then tobacco was one of the earliest and strongest adopters of pesticides.
With the chemical revolution came highly effective Organochlorine pesticides that sprang directly from WWII Nazi poison gas experiments, and virtually overnight the tobacco companies switched from human labor in America to ever-diversifying chemical “crop protection agents” in the Third World that let them grow tobacco at a fraction of the cost of human labor, increasing their already insane profits even more. The difference in profit between growing tobacco using hand labor and using chemicals is what has made the tobacco industry rich beyond imagination since 1950, and they’ve used that wealth to make sure that no government gets in the way of their use of those extremely profitable chemicals.
As a result, chemical contaminants that are totally banned on any other consumable product are not regulated at all on tobacco, and the tobacco industry is continually coming up with new exotic chemicals to use on their fields of GM tobacco and all those chemicals are winding up in the lungs of poor smokers and vapers.
The anti-tobacco crusaders have been raising taxes for years, showing studies that prove when tobacco products get more expensive, people smoke less. We’ve got a winner folks – increase prices. That finances a huge bureaucracy that can then run around and invent a lot of ways to justify its existence by “educating” people. They can all have comfy salaries and a “sense of mission”, spending all that easy-come tax money on themselves so that they can “educate” and “persuade” people. They can’t actually”protect” people of course, because the tobacco industry has tied these well-meaning but also self-satisfied and very comfortable health bureaucrats up in very subtle legislative knots to where they actually say that they can’t regulate pesticides in tobacco products and then in the next breath play CYA by saying, with complete sincerity, “We believe that tobacco is so bad that there is no need to focus on pesticide residues.”
Of course, if you DID focus on the pesticide residues, then you would HAVE to do something about tobacco products – like regulate them for example.
Community Tobacco Control Partners Test Results 12/18
The pesticide residues that contaminate tobacco products are simply the incidental result of crop management decisions the industry makes every day. Since these giant international companies grow most of their tobacco in remote parts of the world, out of sight of any regulators who can’t be easily managed with a few dollars they are free to use the most effective crop chemicals available on their Tobacco crops, which means using chemicals that are so toxic to living things (xenobiotics) that they are banned in every place where regulations matter. There is plenty of DDT and other banned pesticides available anywhere in the world outside of the tightly regulated countries, where almost all of the tobacco is grown for US consumption.
The problem with pesticide contamination of Tobacco products is that the Tobacco companies have arranged legislation in the US so that all that health departments can do is “encourage” people to stop smoking and ‘discourage’ them from starting, but they can’t actually touch the tobacco products themselves because they are protected by a core assumption that has cost the Tobacco companies billions to put in place. That core assumption is that Tobacco itself is so bad that nothing else matters. All I have to say is – who benefits from that assumption? Only the Tobacco industry.
Community Tobacco Control Partners Test Results 12/18
I’m getting more than a little tired of hearing the too-clever bullshit from self-serving agencies like FDA and from anti-smoking hustlers like Truth Initiative claiming that organic cigarettes aren’t safer than regular commercial cigarettes because all tobacco is equally hazardous. That’s either a deliberate lie or gross ignorance. They either actually know nothing about the tobacco industry, although they claim to be unimpeachable experts, or they know about the true impact of pesticide contaminants in tobacco products and are in effect co-conspirators in this atrocity.
After all, government at all levels and “non-profit” parasites like Truth Initiative are full partners in the revenues generated by tobacco products, and they have every reason to conceal the fact that they know that pesticides are a major, even primary and 100% preventable cause of smoking-related disease and death. The only reason pesticide residues are in tobacco products at all is because it is much more profitable to produce them that way than to make them cleaner and safer, and the only reason that nobody has called them on this atrocity is because they have spread so much money around in so many places for so many years. If you want to identify tobacco industry dupes or co-conspirators just look for the ones claiming that all tobacco is equally hazardous, organic American Spirit and Swisher Sweets alike.
An Oregon non-profit I started last year just finished testing five brands of tobacco products for pesticide residues, and we found hard evidence of extreme differences between the safety levels of organic tobacco and off-the-shelf mini-mart tobacco products regardless of what you may think about tobacco itself.
What you see above is the first-ever hard data on pesticide residues in regular, commercial tobacco products. See any differences between brands? By the way, what you don’t see here is American Spirit Organic because we tested that and found exactly ZERO pesticide residues.
So please tell me – are there any differences here?
Is the least contaminated tobacco product safer than the most contaminated one, or not?
Even if you assume that the tobacco in all three brands is the same, which it isn’t, would you say there are differences in safety levels, or not?
If someone you love is smoking and you can’t get them to stop, which of the three brands above would you want them to smoke, and why?
If your kid is sneaking off and smoking, which of these brands would you least want them to be smoking, and why?
Looking at that hard data, only blind arrogance or a hidden agenda could continue to claim that the DDT, Carbendazim and Penconazole residues in the little cigars that kids are smoking right now, today doesn’t matter because tobacco itself is so bad anyway. Yet that is exactly what EPA, FDA, all the anti-smoking groups, and all the state health departments pretend to believe. That’s their excuse for doing nothing, and it’s pathetic. Here’s why.
Alcohol products are “so bad anyway” and are certainly right up there with tobacco products in terms of the death, disease, personal and social costs and widespread suffering they cause, but you can bet that there would be an “all hands on deck” emergency alarm sent out if even a few of the pesticides we just found in tobacco products were found in beer or wine down at the mini-mart. That contaminated shit would be pulled from the coolers instantly, and there would be lawsuits and congressional investigations. There would be no shrugging of shoulders and saying what the hell, alcohol is so bad for people anyway that a few pesticides don’t matter.
That may be harsh, but this level of self-serving deceitfulness while enormous numbers of people die from pesticide contaminated tobacco products every year, and while children around the world are sealing their future fates by being lured into smoking these cheap contaminated tobacco products, all of which is 100% preventable, is beyond disgusting.
We ran our tests on off-the-shelf tobacco products from local mini-marts – exactly what the kids buy and where they buy them. The question we asked ourselves after looking at the results is – if it were possible, wouldn’t the kids smoking this trash, idiots that they certainly are, be safer smoking these products if they were exactly the same crap as they are now but weren’t additionally contaminated with the extremely hazardous pesticides?
We know that 1 in 13 of all the children under 17 alive today will die prematurely, painfully and expensively of “smoking-related” disease. That is a whole lot of children and future suffering. Do you think any of it could be prevented just by requiring tobacco manufacturers to remove pesticide residues from their tobacco?
They could do that, almost in a flash. Why don’t they? Because they don’t have to, and because it’s much more profitable to use chemicals than to use labor, even in the remote areas of the Third World where they grow their tobacco out of sight of regulators and inspectors.
The fact is that millions of future deaths can very likely be prevented by acting now to set reasonable standards for pesticide residues in tobacco products. Those standards exist – simply look at Oregon’s pesticide residue “Action Levels” for Cannabis, or the FDA’s own “Action Levels” for DDT in everything but tobacco. Everything.
Every tobacco product on the market could be made with organic tobacco – no problem. Give the industry 3-5 years and a drop-dead set of conditions and they will do whatever they have to do. It would take longer to actually become organic, but in 3-5 years the world tobacco supply could be 75% cleared of pesticide residues.
However as long as “players” like FDA and Truth Initiative and others like them play the “All Tobacco Is Equally Bad” game nothing will change. Of the total number of smokers dying each year, a significant number die because of the arrogant conceit of those who believe (or at least pretend to believe) they know all the truth there is to know about Tobacco when they have never once set foot in any tobacco field anywhere, much less a field that has just been sprayed with DDT in Nicaragua or Brazil.
And then in 2015 the moralists and parasites had the nerve to go after organic tobacco. The problem is that they apparently don’t know what Tobacco is, or really that much about it, because if they did they wouldn’t have gotten themselves into the really stupid trap of insisting for the record that there’s no difference between organic tobacco and severely contaminated tobacco. They may claim when finally confronted that they don’t know about all those pesticides, but they are on the record as fully informed.
Of course if they did admit they have known about the pesticides all along then they would also have to admit culpability in 50 years of countless deaths and measureless suffering that could have been completely prevented by insisting on reasonable regulations on pesticide residues in tobacco products. The problem of organochlorine pesticides in heavy concentrations in tobacco products was first realized in the 1950’s, and was heavily documented through the 1960’s. There was testimony before the Senate calling specific attention to the problem. That issue quickly died in the US Senate of 1969.
Then in the 1970’s as smoking and health issues became a major public and scientific concern, the Tobacco industry realized it had a severe problem, and a nationwide lid was clamped on any research referring to pesticides in tobacco products. Research continued in other countries and has resulted in strict but reasonable laws regulating pesticide residues in tobacco products. But in the US beginning in the 1970’s what research couldn’t be directly corrupted or subtly misdirected was subverted through strategies like the “Reference Cigarette” program.
That’s quite a few years of preventable deaths that lie at the feet of those who have been so fixed on hating what they believed was Tobacco that they never once stopped to ask if it was actually Tobacco they were hating.
But then in 2015 they scored what they thought was a face-saving victory – they got RJR to go public and say the words – organic tobacco does not mean a safer cigarette. They finally got payback for years of feeling powerless in the face of the whole tobacco industry. unfortunately, we know that FDA was only able to force RJR to agree to their lies because RJR didn’t want to have to defend American Spirit organic by showing WHY American Spirit organic cigarettes are safer. They are safer because they aren’t drenched with pesticides like every other commercial tobacco brand, including every other RJR brand besides organic American Spirit.
Notice that in the data tables above even the regular American Spirit Blue non-organic brand is lower in pesticides than the Marlboro or another RJR brand, Camel. That’s a big difference in safety levels even among non-organic brands, much less between organic and non-organic. However, if RJR had defended American Spirit organic tobacco on that simple evidence-based premise then they would have had to admit how contaminated all their other products are, and why. Oops! That’s a non-starter. Think of the lawsuits!
So it was a much, much better deal for RJR to let FDA pretend they scored a big win, just like years before the Surgeon General’s warnings were a godsend to tobacco manufacturers. It let them say – hey, you were warned. The so-called “Tobacco Settlement” was an even bigger fraud – look at what is actually being done with all that money. Lots of “Tobacco is really really bad” advertising, lots of huge salaries and nice perks, everybody congratulating themselves on what a great job they’re doing, and no change in the numbers of people suffering and dying, or in the number of kids heading down that dead-end road.
Until my little non-profit finally got funding and was able to begin testing tobacco products a few months ago, not one dime has ever been spent by the “anti-tobacco” forces to test for these contaminants that by themselves make these products illegal, period. But then the “Tobacco is really really bad” game would be over, wouldn’t it. Imagine the public reaction if it became clear that people in positions of responsibility and authority had known about pesticide contamination of tobacco products for many smokers’ lifetimes and had never once spoken out.
FDA knows what it has to do in return for being allowed to look like a winner in the organic tobacco derby. Their part of the deal is not to make too much noise about all those “crop protection agents”. That’s what the industry calls pesticides. After all, crops need protection, right? so much better than a nasty word ending in “cide”.
FDA and the anti-tobacco PR and advertising shills are allowed to beat the drums and make up endless variations of the “Tobacco Is So Bad” meme because that doesn’t hurt the tobacco industry one bit, but it does allow thousands of people to keep doing extremely dubious work to justify their lucrative titles and careers “fighting tobacco”.
Ever wonder why FDA is being so helpful in the industry’s pivot away from tobacco and toward e-cigarettes? Are they are all hoping that their complicity in 50 years of slaughter for profit will just slide on out of sight? Yes, complicity. FDA has had institutional knowledge of the presence of heavy concentrations of hazardous pesticides in tobacco products for over 20 years and has not once, ever brought it up in any hearings or testimony or research. That’s complicity.
I call the tobacco industry’s reckless, negligent, criminal behavior “slaughter for profit” simply because the tobacco industry doesn’t have to use pesticides at all. Traditional tobacco growers used hand labor for hundreds of years and did just fine. The tobacco companies use chemicals in place of labor strictly for increased profits and they have rigged the regulatory systems of the world so that they are protected from the consequences of their greed-driven decisions.
No matter. I’m here to call bullshit right now with simple hard evidence. AKA facts. You decide.
Check the data below after you read the following incredible weasel-statements and then you tell me:
Are these bureaucrats full of shit or not?
Are some tobacco products safer than others, or not?
Should people who smoke be protected from these contaminants, or do they deserve whatever happens to them?
If these chemicals were in wine or beer, would that be OK just because alcohol is known to be so hazardous to health anyway.
Does it not matter that the most hazardous of these brands, the one with 375 times the highest background level of DDT, is the one that most kids 11-16 love?
“Because use of tobacco products, with or without pesticide residues, is so hazardous to health, all of the Oregon Health Authority’s efforts around tobacco are aimed at discouraging use of tobacco products and encouraging cessation of tobacco use in people already using it.” Oregon Health Authority 2018
“EPA does not assess intermediate or long-term risks of pesticide residues to smokers because of the severity of health effects linked to use of tobacco products themselves.” EPA 2018
“Organic,” “natural” or “additive-free” product labels may imply a healthier or safer choice, but that couldn’t be further from the truth when it comes to tobacco products. A cigarette with organic tobacco or tobacco with no additives does not make it healthier or safer than other cigarettes.” Truth Initiative 2018
No differences at all? Really?
Notice the array of fungicides, marked in red. If you’re familiar with HIV/AIDS therapy, think what inhaling these fungicides is doing to patients. Think of what the worldwide effects on fungicide resistance will be from the exposure of millions of smokers to this fungicide cocktail. Concerned about fungal resistance? Look at tobacco products and consider how simple it would be to produce tobacco organically, or at least to some reasonable standards. And people really do have the right to know.
Pesticide Residue Test Sample #1 Multnomah County, Oregon Received 12/13/2018 from Columbia Food Labs/Pixis
billdrake4470@gmail.com
Oregon Cannabis Action Levels (PPM) – A Reasonable Standard
I’ll skip the long, long back story and get right to the point. If you’ve been looking for a way that individuals and small groups of people acting on their own initiative can control dangerous tobacco products at the local level, this is it. Here’s wishing you a successful 2019.
I recently had a number of off-the-shelf tobacco brands tested for pesticide residues. This was the first time this has been done in the US, in spite of the massive amounts of tax and private money spent every year on so-called “tobacco control and prevention”.
In this post I’m including hard evidence showing the concentration of illegal, totally banned DDT I found on the most popular brand of sweet & fruity little cigars, Swisher Sweets – the top choice among low-income, Black and Hispanic teens. They are also arguably the most toxic piece of shit in the whole pile of toxic shit that this rat pack of corporate criminals sells to kids. Don’t get me wrong – I found extreme pesticide contamination on many of the brands I tested – it’s just that the little cigars stood way out at the top of the contamination chart.
Don’t just take my word for the toxicity of little cigars – the University of North Carolina conducted an extensive study in 2016 comparing the toxicity of little cigar smoke, including swisher Sweets, compared with cigarette smoke. This study was also the first of its kind, just like my pesticide residue study. The North Carolina researchers found detailed hard evidence that little cigars are extremely toxic and are particularly dangerous to young, Black, and Latino smokers compared with cigarettes. (This study, combined with the hard evidence I’m sharing in this post, will blow your mind if you care about mass poisoning of innocent children.)
The one area that this North Carolina study missed was the key role that pesticide residues play in tobacco product toxicity. Like every other scientific and medical study before them, these researchers totally failed to account for pesticide contamination in the tobacco products they tested, and so they were understandably puzzled by the extreme levels of toxicity they found.
However, once you factor in pesticide contamination, the whole picture emerges clearly. The North Carolina data makes sense. It’s the differences in the pesticide burdens of different types of tobacco products that account for the differences in toxicity among types of tobacco products. That’s why it’s so important for local communities to understand the nature of this hidden threat to their children.
I found actionable levels of many different pesticide residues in all the tobacco products I just tested, including several cigarette brands popular with kids. But the overall pesticide contamination of Tobacco products, which regulators manage to ignore, isn’t the key point here. The key point for tobacco product control at the local level is that these little cigar/DDT results are not only grim news for smokers but flat out violate the law.
It is illegal to sell any product contaminated with this level of DDT anywhere in the US. and much of the world. Only soil or water-residual DDT is allowed in any food, beverage, cosmetic or other consumer product, and there is no way that the level I found could occur as a residual from soil or water – it was sprayed on the tobacco used to make this product, and it was sprayed recently. (See commentary below the data.)
The DDT concentration shown below is 700+ times the highest level found anywhere in the entire US food chain from lingering soil or water contamination, and I will guarantee that a sampling of 100 such products will yield similarly shocking results.
So here’s my suggestion. Take this data on your phone to your health department. Show them the DDT levels. Tell them that the same little cigar products are being sold at the mini-mart. (They are.)
But here’s the beauty of the hard evidence I’m offering. It doesn’t matter if your local health officials think they can regulate tobacco products specifically or not. It doesn’t matter if they think have the authority to regulate tobacco products or not. Unless they are somehow forbidden to investigate and take action in cases of toxic substance contamination in consumer products being sold to children in your county, they do have the authority to act. You may have to make them act by going to the School Board, the District Attorney, and your local media, but they do have the authority to act locally and independently on high-level DDT contamination of anything in your community – period.
These contaminated tobacco products are illegal not because they are tobacco products; they are illegal because they are consumer products contaminated with hazardous concentrations of extremely hazardous, totally banned pesticide chemicals that will be emitted when they are used as intended by the manufacturer.
If you enjoy a sweet irony, I can guarantee that when all the testing is done, most of the premium cigars that the 1% love will turn out to be the most highly contaminated of all. Although some premium cigar tobacco growers still use traditional methods, and grow tobacco without industrial chemicals, I’m quite certain that most premium cigars will prove to be far more contaminated than the cheap little cigars the busboys out behind that five-star restaurant have to smoke.
Pesticide Residue Test Sample #1 Multnomah County, Oregon Received 12/13/2018
** Relevant to risk assessment for these “Little Cigars”; the highest levels of DDT p, p- in all foods tested by FDA in their comprehensive “Total Diet Reports” for 2017, were for catfish filets and for frozen potato fries. The 2.17 ng/g potatoes and 2.3 ng/g levels expressed in the FDA “Total Diet Study” are the equivalents of 0.00217 mg/kg for potatoes and 0.0023 mg/kg for catfish. compared with 0.816 mg/kg in the single little cigar sample tested. Based on my knowledge of tobacco industry practices, additional testing will show serious levels of OCP and other classes of pesticide contamination particularly on tobacco products in the “discount” and low-price market segments and, as we will see, in the premium cigar market segment as well.
I know for certain that as we test other tobacco products, especially the cheap ones, we’ll find stuff that makes DDT look like a hint of mint. However, this data is right now, and approximately 800,000 children between 11-15 are smoking this particular brand of little cigar every day and inhaling every one of the pesticides listed.
But even if the only contaminant were the 0.816 mg/kg (or 816 mcg/kg) DDT ….
“Average adult intakes of DDT were estimated to be 62 µg/person/day (1000 micrograms = 1 milligram) in 1965 and 240 µg/person/day in 1970, before the DDT ban was instituted. The FDA Total Diet Studies show that the daily intakes have fallen since the ban, with daily intakes (for a 16-year-old, 70 kg male) averaging 6.51, 2.38, 1.49, and 0.97 µg/person/day for 1978–1979, 1979–1980, 1984–1986, and 1986–1991, respectively.” https://ntp.niehs.nih.gov/ntp/htdocs/chem_background/exsumpdf/ddt_508.pdf
“Based on all of the evidence available, the Department of Health and Human Services has determined that DDT is reasonably anticipated to be a human carcinogen. Similarly, the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) has determined that DDT is possibly carcinogenic to humans. EPA has determined that DDT, DDE, and DDD are probable human carcinogens.”
It was at least partly from the hidden and unaccounted-for pesticides, which were overlooked in this study as they have been overlooked in virtually every American scientific and medical study of “tobacco” smoke. Little cigars are far more contaminated with far more toxic “crop protection agents” than cigarettes because of differences in how the tobacco is raised, and in how much highly contaminated tobacco manufacturing waste is used in making the product.
Highwaymen in the Middle Ages gave travelers a choice – they could hand over their cash and all their possessions, or they could hand over their life. At least those criminals gave their victims a choice.
Big tobacco wants both. “They just keep lining up for a smoke, so we grab ’em, drain ’em, and toss ’em aside – there’s plenty more coming down the highway. “
This post offers you an inside look at how Big Tobacco spreads its money around to buy scientists and regulators in order to create meaningless tobacco regulations based on purposely faked science so they can say “See, we’re playing by the rules, so you can’t touch us.”
Well, I do believe that Big Tobacco has outsmarted itself with its attempt to move smokers away from smoking and into vaporizing. That’s because in order to accomplish this massive feat of social engineering Big Tobacco has inadvertently revealed some things about their industrial practices that will, when clearly understood, point directly to their massive corporate crimes.
This post is an excerpt from a World Health Organization internal document titled: “Tobacco Company Strategies to Undermine Tobacco Control Activities at the World Health Organization”. This 250 page report reveals the extent of Big Tobacco’s subversion, corruption, intimidation and seduction of scientists, regulators, institutions, and anti-tobacco efforts worldwide. WHO estimates that by 2050 Big Tobacco will have killed 1 Billion people in its rampage, and this is a detailed look at how it has managed to accomplish the miracle of killing millions of people for profit and never being held criminally accountable.
This courageous and powerful report reveals in great detail the remarkable efforts Big Tobacco makes to cover its tracks, and it seems pretty clear that the only reason it would go to that enormous trouble and expense would be if they knew that if the truth about what they are really up to were to get out there, and if the truth could break through all that very expensive social engineering they’ve been doing for decades, they would all be doing the CNN perpwalk.
The reason this is relevant to a blog on Coca and Cannabis is that if you look closely at the methods Big Tobacco has used to systematically subvert scientists and government agencies worldwide to protect itself and pursue its goals, you can explain a lot of otherwise puzzling and inconsistent things about the American “War on Drugs”. After you read the following excerpt, and maybe the whole WHO report, see if you don’t agree with me that the “War on Drugs” has had the smell of Big Tobacco all over it since the 1970’s.
THE REPORT, Section Seven: “Subverting Science And Health”
Distorting WHO Research
Tobacco companies have a long history of distorting science to oppose restrictions on tobacco. Some of the tactics the tobacco companies have used for decades to manipulate the scientific and public debate include:
1. Secretly Funding Speakers at WHO Conferences
Tobacco companies have attempted to influence the tone and content of WHO- sponsored scientific conferences by paying “independent” scientists to attend and present papers. For example, Japan Tobacco Inc. (JTI) planned to pay 40 scientists to “present ‘neutral’ papers” at the 6th World Health Conference on Smoking or Health held in Japan in 1987.117 JTI calculated that the 40 scientists they would plant at the conference would exert significant influence:
“J.T.I. is trying to change the very nature and tone of the conference through these efforts.”118
INFOTAB, too, planned to encourage the submission of papers favorable to tobacco companies to the 6th WCToH.119
JTI also planned to get a scientific foundation controlled by tobacco companies (SRFS) involved as a member of the Academic Committee for the conference, to permit JTI to participate in the screening of papers for the conference:
“If the SRFS can send members to this committee, ‘neutral’ papers could be submitted to the conference.”120
2. Holding Scientific Symposia to Promote Pro-Industry Positions, with Tobacco Companies’ Role Concealed
As part of its campaign to undermine the IARC ETS study, tobacco companies arranged for several symposia on ETS at which speakers chosen for views consistent with the tobacco companies’ position would present papers. Tobacco company sponsorship of some of these symposia was concealed or minimized. Some of these conferences were primarily sponsored by tobacco company front organizations, such as Healthy Buildings International and CIAR.121 The views expressed at the symposia were disseminated by tobacco companies as “independent” scientific viewpoints.122
3. Misrepresenting Tobacco Company Work as WHO- Supported
In an apparent attempt to enhance the credibility of a tobacco company-sponsored ETS conference, industry officials widely misrepresented the conference as WHO- sponsored, based on the attendance at the conference of a single WHO official.123
4. Using “Independent” Consultants with Concealed Tobacco Company Ties to Lobby WHO Scientists
Echoing its use of front organizations as surrogates, tobacco companies have used outside scientists with concealed tobacco company ties to approach and lobby WHO on scientific questions related to tobacco.
5. Contacting WHO Study Scientists to Influence Study Results
As part of their plan to undermine the IARC ETS study, tobacco companies set out to establish contacts with the study investigators and collaborators.124 With some exceptions,125 the tobacco companies arranged to have contacts made through outside scientists acting as tobacco company consultants.126 The tobacco company affiliation of the consultants who contacted the IARC investigators was frequently concealed.127 These contacts with IARC scientists were to be used to gather “the best information about the status and likely findings of the study,”128 convince study investigators of the weaknesses of the IARC study,129 and, ultimately, achieve “the objective of no report or a report which draws mild conclusions from its data.”130
Through their contacts with IARC investigators and collaborators the tobacco companies were successful in gaining a large amount of information about the design and conduct of the study. More importantly, they were able to gain confidential information about preliminary study results and about how the study was likely to be interpreted. The tobacco companies were not able to influence the outcome of the study, however.
6. Presenting Tobacco Company Arguments Through “Independent” Scientists with Concealed Tobacco Company Ties
Tobacco companies’ scientific consultants have also lobbied WHO on scientific issues without revealing their tobacco company ties. For example, Peter Lee, a tobacco company consultant, wrote to the Director-General of WHO,131 apparently at BAT’s request, providing a lengthy criticism of a WHO study of mortality from tobacco use. In his letter, Lee described himself as “an independent statistician/epidemiologist who has followed the literature on smoking and health very closely for over 20 years.” He did not disclose any tobacco industry affiliations.132
7. Compromising Independence and Credibility of WHO Studies by Involving Investigators in Tobacco Company Research or Activities
Tobacco companies, through their front organization CIAR, attempted to involve IARC and its investigators in collaborative ventures. These ventures included (1) using IARC investigators to conduct studies on ETS confounders that could be used by tobacco companies to challenge the IARC study, (2) offering research grants to IARC investigators, and (3) offering to put an IARC investigator on CIAR’s advisory board.133
According to the study coordinator, IARC itself did not pursue any proposed collaboration once IARC became aware of CIAR’s tobacco company connections.134 One IARC collaborator did, however, conduct a study for CIAR on confounders. The tobacco companies’ purpose in using an IARC collaborator was almost certainly to undermine the IARC study results by attempting to produce evidence, under the name of one of IARC’s own investigators, that would undercut the study.
Tobacco companies conducted and publicly promoted a large number of studies, conferences, and literature reviews on ETS that were designed to challenge the validity of the IARC ETS study. These activities were generally carried out through third parties to create the appearance that the data and opinions were independent of tobacco industry influence.
The data from these studies were used successfully by industry officials when the IARC study results were released to cast doubt on the study. For example, the Sunday Telegraph cited the tobacco company-financed studies as evidence that:
“Passive smokers inhale the equivalent of just six cigarettes a year from other people’s smoke, according to the largest ever study of actual exposure levels of non-smokers. The figure, which undermines previous warnings about the dangers of passive smoking, is a thousand times lower than that faced by direct smokers, and so tiny that it could not be measured statistically.”135
8. Creating an Ostensibly Independent Coalition of Scientists
Tobacco companies sought to create an ostensibly independent coalition of scientists in Europe to help criticize the IARC study and other scientific studies used to support tobacco control policies.136 Like The Advancement of Sound Science Coalition (TASSC) created by Philip Morris and a public relations firm in the US, the European group would appear to be independent but would be initiated and funded by tobacco companies and by other industries.137
The committee of experts was unable to determine the success of this plan. Ong and Glantz have reported, however, that the likely outcome of this initiative was the European Science and Environment Forum (ESEF),138 although ESEF claims to receive little or no tobacco industry funding.139 ESEF has listed on its website at least two working papers criticizing the IARC ETS study, and the methods used in ETS epidemiological studies.140 Lorraine Moody, ESEF’s “key contact,”141 wrote an opinion piece in the Wall Street Journal claiming that the IARC study showed a possibly “trivial or nonexistent” risk of lung cancer from ETS, demonstrating that the health risks of ETS are overstated.142
9. Misrepresenting Scientific Studies to the Media and Regulators
The results of the IARC ETS study, released in 1998, showed that non-smoking spouses of smokers have an estimated 16% increased risk of developing lung cancer and that non-smokers exposed to ETS in the workplace have an estimated 17% increased risk of developing lung cancer.143 IARC’s reported results were consistent with the results of other ETS studies, showing an increased risk of lung cancer for nonsmokers exposed to ETS by a spouse or in the workplace.144 However, there were not enough subjects in the study for the increased risk to reach “statistical significance,” using common statistical methods (i.e., at the 95% confidence level).145
Shortly after the results of the IARC ETS study were released, BAT issued a press release stating: “New scientific research from the World Health Organization has shown the risk of lung cancer from environmental tobacco smoke to be either non-existent or too small to be measured at a meaningful level.”146 Thus, BAT claimed that the lack of statistical significance was equivalent to a finding that there was no relationship between ETS and lung cancer. These claims were picked up first by the Sunday Telegraph and then by other news outlets.
Despite subsequent clarifying statements from IARC and WHO about the study results, the misrepresentation of the study results in the BAT news release was repeated in media accounts around the world. Tobacco companies may also have distorted the IARC study results when addressing regulatory authorities.
10. Staging Media Events or Other Diversions to Discredit or Distract Attention from WHO Tobacco Control Activities
Tobacco companies planned a series of distractions from the 8th World Conference on Tobacco OR Health. These plans, at least some of which were carried out, included a media campaign just before the 8th WCToH, emphasizing the need for childhood immunizations; a major soccer game to distract attention from Jimmy Carter’s arrival; training journalists to disrupt a press conference held by the conference organizers; and embarrassing US Senator Ted Kennedy by planting journalists to ask questions about drinking and sexual harassment allegations.
One unattributed BAT document with the handwritten title “Dietrich/WHO” on the title page also planned an event, called the “Global Children’s Health Conference,” to “distract the media from extensive coverage of the May 31, 1990 International Anti- Smoking Day and the 1990 theme of Smoking and Children.”147 According to the document, through the Institute for IIHD, run by Paul Dietrich (see Chapter VI), BAT would hold a conference for business and government leaders and launch a longer- term strategy to increase private funding for children’s health issue. In describing the program strategy, the BAT document states:
“ The event will be staged to pre-empt monitored WHO meetings and conferences“,150 had confidential WHO contacts,151 and obtained confidential documents and information.152 Examples of clandestine surveillance activities are described in several of the case studies.
“The conference can facilitate the development of a long-term initiative to counteract the WHO’s anti- smoking campaign
“At no time during the event will the issue of smoking be addressed…
“…Design the Conference to address primary health needs of children underscoring the ‘real crisis’. Develop an oblique critique of WHO’s anti- smoking campaign which identifies it as trivial when the global infants’ and children’s crisis is evaluated.
“Introduce alternative solutions which, in the long-term, could successfully undermine the WHO’s overall mandate.”148
It appears that BAT did not carry through with this conference.
11. Conducting Systematic Surveillance of WHO Activities
Tobacco companies have carried out intensive monitoring of WHO and its Regional Offices to gather intelligence about its tobacco control programs.149
Some of the industry’s intelligence-gathering has been conducted openly, through attendance at open meetings and conferences and through open contacts with WHO and other UN officials.
There is also evidence, however, that tobacco companies have secretly monitored conferences,150 had confidential WHO contacts,151 and obtained confidential documents and information.152
Examples of clandestine surveillance activities are described in several of the case studies.
This ends the excerpt. You can read and download the full 250 page UN Report in PDF format here:
If you are inclined to look at references, here they are – just for this section. The entire report contains thousands of similarly damning references that put the moral degradation and greed of this industry on full display. And they really don’t care, because they have convinced themselves that they are untouchable. They would do well to remember – Al Capone was brought down by a simple little tax violation and not by any of his vast criminal conspiracies and crimes.
I think that the industry’s attempt to engineer a shift from smoking to vaporizing is going to reveal the tobacco industry’s equivalent of a simple little tax evasion crime that will be enough, when all the evidence is brought to bear, for the initiation of a crimes against humanity trial in the World Court that will ultimately result in worldwide government and civil seizure of tobacco industry assets.
Notes & References
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Background to the Structure and Operations of the Activist Movement. November 15, 1994.
Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501110753– 0775. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 68.
Seymour M. 6 September 1996 IARC European Response Plan Workshop. August 8, 1996.
Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2063604476– 4498. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 71.
Hauser N. Trip Report-RomeIFAO November 26-29, 1984. November 26, 1984. Philip Morris
Hartogh J. Report by Task Force 5th World Conference on Smoking and Health, Winnipeg, Canada, July 1983. February 26, 1981. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2025049376–9377. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33514.
The World Health Organization (WHO): Its Work Related to the Activities of the International Tobacco Industry. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501442830–2897 at 2501442889–2897. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 5.
Lojacono G. Research Group Informal Meeting On: Health Effects of ETS in Europe-Paris-P. Broussell Hospital (Ville}uif 13I14 March, 1991). March 1991est. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501356073–6076. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33534.
JMH–possibly Hartogh J. Action Plan proposed by ICOSI Task Force 4th World Conference on Smoking & Health. January 29, 1979. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501015212–5215. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33549.
The World Health Organization (WHO): Its Work Related to the Activities of the International Tobacco Industry. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501442830–2897 at 2834. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 5.
Tully R. 8th WCTH. January 29, 1992. British American Tobacco Company. 300504241– 4252. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33334.
The World Health Organization (WHO): Its Work Related to the Activities of the International Tobacco Industry. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501442830–2897 at 2889– 2890. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 5.
Informal Meeting of the IARC Research Group on ETS and Human Cancer. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501349504–9507. http://www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33636.
47th WHO World Assembly: Informal meeting of some members of the IARC study group “ETS and the Lung Cancer”. Geneva May 3-6, 1994. Philip Morris Companies Inc. May 5, 1994.
Wilhelmus J. WHO. April 18, 1995. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2063625254. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33541.
CECCM. IARC Study. April 4, 1995. British American Tobacco Company. 500804531– 4537. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33774.
Cerioli A. Report on my attendance to the Conference “Conoscenze Scientifiche, Seperi Popolari e Socita Umana alle Soglie del Duemile. Attualite del Pensiero di A. Maccacaro.” January 27, 1997. Philip Morris
Menchaca. January 25, 1990. British American Tobacco Company. 502587287. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33237.
Lojacono G. Research Group Informal Meeting On: Health Effects of ETS in Europe-Paris-P. Broussell Hospital (Ville}uif 13I14 March, 1991). March 14, 1991est. Philip Morris
Pages R. [Forwarding note from H. Reif: IARC Study]. July 19, 1993. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2025470098. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 32800.
Dietrich P. [Letter to Sharon Boyse, Enclosing Memo of Visit to Thailand and Philippines]. January 29, 1992. British American Tobacco Company. 300516024–37. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33682.
WHOIIOCUIUICC: Strategies and Tactics. January 31, 1989. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501045143–5147 at 5143. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 32846.
Appendix I, INFOTAB January 1989 Discussion Paper. January 30, 1989. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501045258–5268 at 5262. pmdocs.com. UQ 33561.
World Watch: Protecting our Global ‘Next Generation’-A Proposed Conference on Children’s Health Issues. October 1989. 300516227–6285 at 6235. Guildford Document Depository. UQ
WHOIIOCUIUICC: Strategies and Tactics. January 31, 1989. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501045143–5147 at 5143. pmdocs.com. UQ 32846.
Hartogh JM. To all members of the ICOSI task force 4th world conference on smoking and health. [Memo by E. Brueckner.] June 26, 1979. British American Tobacco Company. 100433043–3047 at 3046. Guildford Document Depository. UQ
WHOIIOCUIUICC: Strategies and Tactics. January 31, 1989. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501045143–5147 at 5146. pmdocs.com. UQ 32846.
Appendix I, INFOTAB January 1989 Discussion Paper. January 30, 1989. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501045258–5268. pmdocs.com. UQ 33561.
PMI Corporate Affairs Action Plan 1990. November 2, 1989est. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2500019979–9999 at 9980–9982. pmdocs.com. UQ 33558.
Sullivan J. IARC Study. September 2, 1993. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501117793– 7797 at 7795. pmdocs.com. UQ 33603
Egawa E. April 25, 1986. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2021654119–4123. pmdocs.com. UQ 66.
Bloxidge JA. International Tobacco Growers’ Association (ITGA). October 11, 1988. British American Tobacco Company. 502555415–5417 at 5417. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33284.
Boyse S. 8th World Conference on Tobacco and Health. August 28, 1991. British American Tobacco Company. 202019292–9293 at 9292. Guildford Document Depository. UQ
Bible G. Corporate Affairs Conference I Action Plan. December 13, 1986. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2021596422–6432 at 6429. pmdocs.com. UQ 32834.
Appendix I, INFOTAB January 1989 Discussion Paper. January 30, 1989. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501045258–5268. pmdocs.com. UQ 33561.
Interview with Alan Lopez, Coordinator, Epidemiology and Burden of Disease, World Health Organization, May 4,
Oldman M. [Letter to G Pedlow]. March 13, 1991. British American Tobacco Company. 502555357–5363 at 5363. Guildford Document Depository. UQ
Agro-Tobacco Services-Programme Review No1. British American Tobacco Company. 502552606–2611 at 2609. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33290.
Interview with Alan Lopez, May 4,
Lee PN. Helmut Schievelbein. August 9, 1979. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501159889–9891 at 9889. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33717.
Minutes of the Meeting of the Working Group of the E.E.C. Tobacco Manufacturers’ Associations, Held in Luxemburg on 4th and 5th October 1979. November 11, 1979. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501015083–5096 at 5088. pmdocs.com. UQ 33716.
Belcher P. Scientific Committee on Tobacco and Health (SCTH). February 9, 1994. Rothmans International. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2024188905–8907 at 8905. pmdocs.com. UQ 33715.
Independent Scientific Review of the Toxic Substances Board Report, May 1989, Summary, Commissioned by the Tobacco Institute of New Zealand. 1989est. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2504203558–3559. pmdocs.com. UQ 33535.
Collett C. Memo to Ted Sterling re: International Symposium on Environmental Tobacco Smoke, November 3-4, 1989.
November 1989est. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2062856942. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33536.
Rothman’s International Tobacco ETS Workshop. May 1992est. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501237099. pmdocs.com. UQ 33532.
25 . Pen Pictures of Guest Speakers. May 1992est. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501237101– 7103 at 7101. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33531.
S&H. Re: Dr. Furst-Review of Non-Smoker Problem CTR Special Pro}ect. 1976est. Lorillard Tobacco Company. 03747419. TDO Supersite at tobaccodocuments.org. UQ 33714.
From the record before Congress, the Case for Defeat of S. 772. 1983est. Tobacco Institute. TIMN 0353310–3320 at 3312. TDO Supersite at tobaccodocuments.org/. UQ 33729.
Purvis A, Johnson J. Privileged and confidential attorneyIclient connumications. Trial Report, SummaryITestimonyIPro}ection. April 21, 1988. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2025880540– 0543. Bliley Documents at tobaccodocuments.org. UQ 33730.
Tobacco Institute Newsletter. March 12, 1982. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 515841024. Bliley Documents at tobaccodocuments.org. UQ 98.
Hoel D. Confidential-For counsel only. July 10, 1979. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 6267450002. Bliley Documents at www.tobaccodocuments.org. UQ 99.
Tobacco Institute Newsletter. March 12, 1982. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 515841024. Bliley Documents at tobaccodocuments.org. UQ 98.
Lyberopoulos H. ARISE 1994-95 Activities and Funding. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2024208096–8099. pmdocs.com. UQ 33779.
Information on Associates for Research in Substance En}oyment Meeting in Venice. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company. 508300651–0667 at 0652. http://www.rjrtdocs UQ 33749.
Wilhelmus J. WHO. April 18, 1995. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2063625254. pmdocs.com. UQ 33541.
Luik J, Snel J, Warburton D. ARISE (Associates for Research into the Science of En}oyment): A Summary of the Workshop Held in April 1995. April 1995est. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company. 511818234–8241. rjrtdocs.com. UQ 33731.
The World Health Organization. December 1985est. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2023267436. pmdocs.com. UQ 46.
36 . Reif H. Continuation of the Vettorazzi Pro}ect. March 25, 1992. Philip Morris Companies Inc. PM 2025594741–4743 at 4742. http://www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33466.
Consultant to ICOSI on International Organisations. August 1980est. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2025049734. pmdocs.com. UQ 37.
Developing Countries Group (DCG). Progress report covering events since the ICOSI board of directors meeting October 5I8th, 1980. February 1981est. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2025049364–9374 at 9365. pmdocs.com. UQ 40.
Hauser. [Letter to AG Leeks]. April 20, 1983. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2023273908– 3909. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 42.
Secretariat Interim Report. December 28,1984. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2023272512– 2617 at 2514. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 43.
January 11, 1991. British American Tobacco Company. 300557237–7259 at 7241. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33350.
January 11, 1991. British American Tobacco Company. 300557237–7259 at 7240. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33350.
January 11, 1991. British American Tobacco Company. 300557237–7259 at 7256. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33350.
Interviews with Neil Collishaw, Leanne Riley, and Barbara Zolty, all former employees of the WHO’s Tobacco or Health Program, Feb. 4, 2000.
Boca Raton Action Plan: WHOIIOCUIUICC: Strategies and Tactics. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501045143–5147 at 5146. pmdocs.com. UQ 32846.
E–mail communication from Neil Collishaw. March 29,
Interviews with Neil Collishaw, Barbara Zolty, and Leanne Riley, February 4,
E–mail communication from Barbara Zolty, March 2,
Sullivan J. IARC Study. September 2, 1993. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501117793– 7797 at 7795. pmdocs.com. UQ 33603.
Von Maerestetten C. IARC. July 26, 1993. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2025493295. pmdocs.com. UQ 33776.
IARC Study. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501347168–7173 at 7172. pmdocs.com. UQ 33595.
Pages R. Update 2: IARC study of ETS and lung cancer. August 2, 1993. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 20232999819. http://www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33733.
Memo on vaccines for world health organization. October 25, 1971. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2012581044. pmdocs.com. UQ 4.
Boca Raton Action Plan: WHOIIOCUIUICC: Strategies and Tactics. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501045143–5147 at 5146. pmdocs.com. UQ 32846.
Flavor and Extract Manufacturers Association. Invoice. August 17, 1995. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2050761274. pmdocs.com. UQ 33546.
Schrankel K. Final Report to Contributors of Anethole Research Fund. August 25, 1998. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2063597040. pmdocs.com. UQ 33548.
Minutes of Anethole Task Force. May 2, 1996. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2063616600. pmdocs.com. UQ 33547.
Minutes of Anethole Task Force. May 2, 1996. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2063616600. pmdocs.com. UQ 33547.
Schrankel. Final Report to Contributors of Anethole Research Fund. August 25, 1998. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2063597040. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33548 TIMN270055–0059 at 0058. http://www.tobaccoinstitute.com. UQ 32904.
Hartogh JM. To all members of the ICOSI task force 4th world conference on smoking and health. [Memo by E. Brueckner.] June 26, 1979. British American Tobacco Company. 100433043–3047. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33162.
Oldman M. [Letter to G Pedlow]. March 13, 1991. British American Tobacco Company. 502555357–5363 at 5358. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33278.
Action Plan proposed by ICOSI Task Force on 4th World Conference On Smoking & Health Stockholm, June 18-22,1979. January 30, 1979. Council for Tobacco Research. 10395689–5695.
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Observations on the Fifth World Conference on Smoking and Health by a Consultant, Winnipeg, July 1983. July 1983est. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501021685–1709 at 1685. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 32890.
Corti A. Director of Information Services, INFOTAB. Latin American Meetings-
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GenevaIRome, March 9-15, 1987. January 15,
Developing Countries Ad Hoc Group (DCG). Progress Report Covering Events Since the ICOSI Board of Directors Meeting on 19th February, 1980. August 1980est. Philip Morris 1987. British American Tobacco Company. 301760973–0979 at 0979. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33254
Appendix I, INFOTAB January 1989, Discussion Paper. January 30, 1989. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501045258–5268 at 5262. Minnesota Document Depository. UQ 33561.
Pro}ect Report Covering Pro}ects and Action Plans Since the Board of Directors Meeting on March 30, 1981. 1981est. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2025048077–8088 at 8077. pmdocs.com. UQ 41.
Pro}ect Report Covering Pro}ects and Action Plans Since the Board of Directors Meeting on March 30, 1981. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2025048077–8088 at 8082. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 41.
Verkerk H. Fifth World Conference on Smoking and Health-Winnepeg. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501021564–1586 at 1577. pmdocs.com. UQ 32888.
Secretariat Interim Report. December 28, 1984. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2023272512– 2617 at 2594. pmdocs.com. UQ 43.
INFOTAB Board of Director’s (BOD) Meeting-March 30, 1981. April 6, 1981. 502741855. Bliley Documents at www.tobaccodocuments.org. UQ 60.
Witt S. International Committee on Smoking Issues Lausanne-November 10-12, 1977.
Schlosser A, Mine K (Chadbourne, Parke). Representative Compilation of Literature Describing the Benefits of Tobacco. April 29, 1986. Brown & Williamson Company.
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Oldman M. [Letter to D. Bacon, enclosing “Agro-Tobacco Services (ATS), Proposal for a Consultancy Agreement”]. January 7, 1992. British American Tobacco Company. 502552644–2654 at 2650. Guildford Document Depository. UQ
Oldman M. [Letter to D. Bacon, enclosing “Agro-Tobacco Services (ATS), Proposal for a Consultancy Agreement”]. January 7, 1992. British American Tobacco Company. 502552644–2654 at 2647. Guildford Document Depository. UQ
Oldman M. [Letter to G. Pedlow]. March 13, 1991. British American Tobacco Company. 502555357–5363 at 5361. Guildford Document Depository. UQ
Oldman M. [Letter to G. Pedlow]. March 13, 1991. British American Tobacco Company. 502555357–5363 at 5358. Guildford Document Depository. UQ
Oldman M. [Letter to G. Pedlow]. March 13, 1991. British American Tobacco Company. 502555357–5363 at 5361. Guildford Document Depository. UQ
Oldman M. [Letter to D Bacon enclosing Agro- tobacco Activity Report for January 1993]. February 10, 1993. British American Tobacco Company. 502552508–2513 at 2512–2513. Guildford Document Depository. UQ
Oldman M. Paper for ITGA General Meeting, 1994. British American Tobacco
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Opukah S. ECOSOCIFAO Positions on Tobacco. August 18, 1994. British American
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Brady B. March 3, 1992. British American
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Hartley R. [Note to Mr. B.D. Bramley].June 28, 1993. British American Tobacco Company.
Oldman M. Paper for ITGA General Meeting, 1994. 1994est. British American Tobacco
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Bacon D. Development Aid, Progress. November 28, 1991. British American Tobacco Company. 202049931–9932 at 9931. Guildford Document Depository. UQ
Bacon D. Development Aid, Progress. November 28, 1991. British American Tobacco Company. 202049931–9932 at 9932. Guildford Document Depository. UQ
Interview with Neil Collishaw, Feb. 4,
Bible G. Corporate Affairs Conference I Action Plan. December 13, 1988. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2021596422–6432 at 6429. pmdocs.com. UQ 32834.
Boca Raton Action Plan: Status Report for the Period Ending January 31, 1989. January 31, 1989. Philip Morris Companies Inc.2500103969–4056 at 3989. www.pmdocs.com.
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Boyse S. [Letter to Peter Hazel, David Bacon, and JJ Mostyn]. August 8, 1991. British American Tobacco Company. 304004032. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33184
Dietrich P. WHO spends money on what? The Wall Street Journal, May 9, 1989. UQ
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Boca Raton Action Plan: Status Report for the Period Ending May 31, 1989. May 31, 1989. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2021592752– 2764 at 2752. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 32859.
Boca Raton Action Plan: Status Report Ending July 31, 1989. July 31, 1989. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2023547120–7135 at 7121. pmdocs.com. UQ 32860.
Boca Raton Action Plan Summary Report December 3, 1988-October 30, 1989. October 30, 1989. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2503005015–5050. pmdocs.com. UQ 32862.
Oldman M. [Letter to D. Bacon enclosing Activity Report, September/October 1993]. November 1, 1993. British American Tobacco Company. 502555329–5331 at 5331. UQ 33276
Ntaba H. Letter to the Editor, International Health and Development, Vol. 1, No. 2, Summer, p. 31. UQ
Boca Raton Action Plan: Status Report for the Period Ending September 30, 1989. September 30, 1989. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501204997–5021 at 4998. pmdocs.com. UQ 32861.
Boyse S. [Letter to Paul Dietrich]. August 7, 1991. British American Tobacco Company. 300516113. Guildford Document Depository. UQ
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Bacon D. Who Benefits from WHO? November 24, 1993. British American Tobacco Company.
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Agenda: “Primer Encuentro de Periodistas Y la Industria Del Tabaco.” June 1991est. British American Tobacco Company. 300565679– 5681. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33675.
BAT Smoking Issues Briefing, Taiwan. September 6–8, 1992. British American
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Oldman M. [Letter to G. Pedlow]. March 13, 1991. British American Tobacco Company. 502555357–5363 at 5359. Guildford Document Depository. UQ
Bloxidge JA. International Tobacco Growers’ Association (ITGA). October 11, 1988. British American Tobacco Company. 502555415– 5417. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33284.
Oldman M. [Letter to G. Pedlow]. March 13, 1991. British American Tobacco Company. 502555357–5363 at 5360. Guildford Document Depository. UQ
Oldman M. Agro-Tobacco Services (ATS), Proposed Plan. November 1991. British American Tobacco Company. 502552655–2667 at 2659. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33303.
INFOTAB International Workshop, Brussels, October 13-16, 1986. October 16, 1986. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501446636–7080 at 6723–6724. pmdocs.com UQ 33566.
Boca Raton Action Plan: Appendix A, WHOIIOCUIUICC: Strategies and Tactics. January 31, 1989. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501045143–5147.pmdocs.com UQ 32846.
Wells JK. INFOTAB Advisory Council Meeting July 14 and 15, 1982. July 21, 1982. Brown &Williamson Company. 680002301–2307.
Bible G. Corporate Affairs Conference I Action Plan. December 13, 1988. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2021596422–6432 at 6429. pmdocs.com. UQ 32834.
Egawa E. April 25, 1986. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2021654119–4123 at 4121. pmdocs.com. UQ 66.
Egawa E. April 25, 1986. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2021654119–4123 at 4121. pmdocs.com. UQ 66.
INFOTAB International Workshop, Brussels, October 13-16, 1986. October 16, 1986. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501446636–7080 at 6677. pmdocs.com UQ 33566.
Egawa E. April 25, 1986. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2021654119–4123 at 4120. pmdocs.com. UQ 66.
Whitley C. Statement of Charles O. Whitley on behalf of the Tobacco Institute before the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment, Committee on Energy and Commerce, US House of Representatives [Draft]. July 9, 1990. Tobacco Institute TIMN 0032095–2141 at 2118. Bliley Documents. tobaccodocuments.org. UQ 32912.
Zhang M. [Attaching Press article in the China Daily on the CIAR’s GEP workshop in Guangzhou.] September 9, 1997. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2063608546–8547. http://www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33752.
Whitley C. Statement of Charles O. Whitley on behalf of the Tobacco Institute before the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment, Committee on Energy and Commerce, US House of Representatives [Draft]. July 9, 1990. Tobacco Institute TIMN 0032095–0032141 at 2118. Bliley Documents. tobaccodocuments.org. UQ 32912.
Press release by the organizers of the expert discussion of the “Physician’s View of Passive Smoking”: Health Danger through Passive Smoking Not Proven. April 1984. Philip Morris Companies. 1002965608–6509. pmdocs.com. UQ 33770.
Masironi R. [Letter to W. Kloepfer]. December 2, 1986. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2025816621–6624. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33771.
Greenberg D. September 15, 1993. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2021184116–4121 at 4119. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33590.
Walk, R.A. IARC Multi-Center Case Control Study of ETS and Lung Cancer, Your memo dated 21 May 93. July 13, 1993. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2025493287. pmdocs.com. UQ 33616.
IARC Study. 1994est. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501347168–7173 at 7169. pmdocs.com. UQ 33595.
Pages R. IARC Study of ETS and Lung Cancer. May 21, 1993. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2500015757. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33617.
Walk, R.A. IARC Multi-Center Case Control Study of ETS and Lung Cancer: Update of information. July 30, 1993. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2029041838–1839. http://www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33618.
Interview with Paolo Boffetta, April 17, 2000.
Greenberg D. September 15, 1993. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2021184116–4121 at 4119. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33590.
IARC Study. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501347168–7173 at 7169. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33595.
Greenberg D. September 15, 1993. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2021184116–4121 at 4118. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33590.
Boyse S. [Letter to Ron Tully.] April 18, 1990. British American Tobacco Company. 400099555. Guildford Document Depository. UQ
Boyse S. [Letter to PN Lee.] December 19, 1989. British American Tobacco Company. 400099679. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33509.
Lee P. May 8, 1990. British American Tobacco Company. 502587275–7284 at 7275. Guildford Document Depository. UQ
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Interview with Paulo Boffetta, April 17,
Matthews R, MacDonald V. Passive smokers inhale six cigarettes a year. Sunday Telegraph. August 16,
Lyberopoulos, H. Presentation on IARC [enclosing overheads]. April 19, 1994. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501355931–5944 at 5942. pmdocs.com. UQ 33604.
Hockaday T, Cohen N. Thoughts on TASSC Europe. March 25, 1994. Philip Morris
Lindheim J. Presentation on Scientist Pro}ect. May 5, 1994. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2025493201–3207 at 3205–3206. pmdocs.com. UQ 33708.
Ong E, Glantz S. Tobacco industry efforts subverting International Agency for Research on Cancer’s second–hand smoke study. The Lancet. 2000; 355: 1253–59.
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British American Tobacco. [ News release]. March 5, 1998. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2063594010–4240 at 4018. pmdocs.com. UQ 33750.
World Watch: Protecting our Global ‘Next Generation’-A Proposed Conference on Children’s Health Issues. October 1989. 300516227–6285 at 6235. Guildford Document Depository. UQ
World Watch: Protecting our Global ‘Next Generation’-A Proposed Conference on Children’s Health Issues. October 1989. British American Tobacco Company. 300516227–6285 at 6236. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33691.
INFOTAB . Item 2 Report From The Secretary General . January 1, 1982est. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2021594826–4836. pmdocs.com. UQ 32.
Background to the Structure and Operations of the Activist Movement. November 15, 1994.
Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501110753– 0775. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 68.
Seymour M. 6 September 1996 IARC European Response Plan Workshop. August 8, 1996.
Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2063604476– 4498. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 71.
Hauser N. Trip Report-RomeIFAO November 26-29, 1984. November 26, 1984. Philip Morris
Hartogh J. Report by Task Force 5th World Conference on Smoking and Health, Winnipeg, Canada, July 1983. February 26, 1981. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2025049376–9377. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33514.
The World Health Organization (WHO): Its Work Related to the Activities of the International Tobacco Industry. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501442830–2897 at 2501442889–2897. pmdocs.com. UQ 5.
Lojacono G. Research Group Informal Meeting On: Health Effects of ETS in Europe-Paris-P. Broussell Hospital (Ville}uif 13I14 March, 1991). March 1991est. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501356073–6076. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33534.
JMH–possibly Hartogh J. Action Plan proposed by ICOSI Task Force 4th World Conference on Smoking & Health. January 29, 1979. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501015212–5215. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33549.
The World Health Organization (WHO): Its Work Related to the Activities of the International Tobacco Industry. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501442830–2897 at 2834. pmdocs.com. UQ 5.
Tully R. 8th WCTH. January 29, 1992. British American Tobacco Company. 300504241– 4252. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33334.
The World Health Organization (WHO): Its Work Related to the Activities of the International Tobacco Industry. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501442830–2897 at 2889– 2890. pmdocs.com. UQ 5.
Informal Meeting of the IARC Research Group on ETS and Human Cancer. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2501349504–9507.
47th WHO World Assembly: Informal meeting of some members of the IARC study group “ETS and the Lung Cancer”. Geneva May 3-6, 1994. Philip Morris Companies Inc. May 5, 1994.
Wilhelmus J. WHO. April 18, 1995. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2063625254. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 33541.
CECCM. IARC Study. April 4, 1995. British American Tobacco Company. 500804531– 4537. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33774.
Cerioli A. Report on my attendance to the Conference “Conoscenze Scientifiche, Seperi Popolari e Socita Umana alle Soglie del Duemile. Attualite del Pensiero di A. Maccacaro.” January 27, 1997. Philip Morris
Menchaca. January 25, 1990. British American Tobacco Company. 502587287. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33237.
Lojacono G. Research Group Informal Meeting On: Health Effects of ETS in Europe-Paris-P. Broussell Hospital (Ville}uif 13I14 March, 1991). March 14, 1991est. Philip Morris
Pages R. [Forwarding note from H. Reif: IARC Study]. July 19, 1993. Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2025470098. www.pmdocs.com. UQ 32800.
Dietrich P. [Letter to Sharon Boyse, Enclosing Memo of Visit to Thailand and Philippines]. January 29, 1992. British American Tobacco Company. 300516024–37. Guildford Document Depository. UQ 33682.
